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Abstract 
 
Development is a social endeavor and a phenomenon which is not limited to technical 
and managerial aspects. The complex features of development emanate from the 
epistemic position of the perspectives employed, the power position of the actors 
involved, and the context and structural parameters that influence the endeavor either 
positively or negatively. The last three decades have witnessed an extensive 
engagement by various actors to address the developmental questions of Africa. The 
African political economic élite have been one of the major actors with this regard. The 
political endeavor of problematizing Africa’s developmental question and influencing 
the discourse and practice of development has hardly been an easy task. The AAF-SAP 
and NEPAD came into existence with the intention of winning the game of the 
determining Africa’s course of action. But the ideas informing the two documents, their 
conformity with or deviance from the mainstream discourse of development, their 
priority in setting the agenda and their impact differs diametrically. The research shows 
how the conceptualization of ‘development’ is heavily influenced by ideology, power 
and above all the knowledge framework of implicit and explicit actors. 
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
Background 
„Development‟ is one of the most prominent concepts that emerged after the Second „World War‟. 
The newly established world order with international institutions like the UN has incorporated this 
concept into the institutional structure and it continued to be at the center of international political 
economy discourse. There has been more than half a century long endeavor by various actors 
attempting to realize a range of developmental objectives. These efforts have been changing across 
the historical line in-tandem with the dynamic international political economy and the core ideas that 
inform its knowledge and practices. Historically speaking, modernization theory is the core point of 
departure in analyzing the development discourse in the above mention period. The assumption that 
upholds the progress oriented step-by-step achievement of economic growth associated with the 
changing values and norms of societies had a prominent role in the 1950s and early 60s. The 
subsequent explanations and theoretical insights forwarded both as a critique and a new paradigm 
have more or less the same kind of conception of development similar to modernization theory, 
either implicitly or explicitly.  
The complexities in the practice of development can be associated with the fact that it is not a 
technical endeavor (like development management) rather a process that can hardly exist beyond the 
core political sphere. The highly political nature of development both in domestic and international 
sphere has an impact in mobilizing the necessary financial and technical support as well as justifying 
its premises. With this regard, the impact of the bi-polar world during the „Cold War‟ period and its 
impact in the development agenda of many countries in the global south can be noted. The political 
nature of the development endeavor has also a direct impact in setting the priorities, contextualizing 
the situation as well as in defining the necessary action and the actors involved in the execution. This 
process of conceptualizing development and setting the priorities and the leading actors is not a 
neutral process rather mediated by power and power relations among the actors involved. 
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With regard to Africa, the emergence of the continent as a political entity, by transcending its mere 
geographical presence have become apparent after the establishment of the Organization of African 
Unity on May 25, 1963. Since then, African political economic elite have been engaged in pursuing 
development and the mission seems to be a non-ending one. The interaction with the external world 
along the common agenda of development has its own course of history that may be associated with 
the historical relations of the region with the West which dates back to more than five centuries. 
There are also home grown, „African initiated‟ development endeavors which are not, of course, 
necessarily detached from the development orientation of the external world. These initiatives which 
claim being „African‟ has their own commonalities that may trigger further analytical questions. 
One of the core factors that prompted the crafting of an „African oriented‟ development path and 
endeavor is the commonly agreed notion that Africa, as a region is not doing well in the 
development business. This assertion is backed by well situated empirical researches as well as 
rhetoric and helps to draw a simple observation on the balance of power in the global political 
economic order. The purpose of this thesis lies in the course of examining the attempt of crafting a 
different development path for Africa in the last two decades. By taking two seemingly authoritative 
development documents as a case study, the thesis tries to critically analyze the claims of these 
development documents in providing a different development paradigm. The documents that are 
taken as a case study are the „The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment 
Programs for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP)’ of 1989 and the 
„New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)’ of 2001. 
Both AAF-SAP and NEPAD have a continental wide agenda of realizing development in Africa by 
addressing the „root‟ causes that hampered Africa‟s fate of being „developed‟. Though the historical 
facts that are taken into consideration in both documents are exactly the same, the image of reality 
they build, the problematization of the context and the conceptualization of development varies 
significantly. And yet, both are ambitious enough to envision the achievement of „self-reliant and 
sustained development‟ in Africa. Questioning the assumptions of development in these documents 
and their reading of the African political economy is the major point of focus in this thesis. There is 
a conscious attempt to avoid an evaluative approach towards the strategies and detail 
implementation programs of the documents. The main purpose of the thesis is to critically examine 
how differently these two documents conceptualized development in African context and what 
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makes them „alternative‟ or „new‟ as they claim in their name. Hence, there is no empirical analysis 
about the success and failure of their implementation in this thesis rather a discursive analysis of the 
concept of development in the documents. 
 Problem Statement 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the „Cold War‟ convinced Francis Fukuyama to call for the 
idea of „the End of History’ (1992). According to Fukuyama and probably for most others, the triumph 
of the neo-liberal paradigm is unconditional in the post-Cold War period. Not surprisingly, most 
African countries were already in the course of embracing the market led economic system since the 
1980s which has become a dominant framework of „development‟. With the specific time limited 
focus of the research (1989-2009), one can mention the various initiatives towards achieving 
„development‟ in Africa. For the sake of simplicity, they can be categorized as „initiatives from inside’ 
and „initiatives from outside’. In the first category the African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP) of 1989, the Abuja Treaty of 1991, the Cairo Agenda of Action 
of 1995, and the NEPAD & APRM initiatives of 2001 can be considered. Moreover, the change and 
transformation of the continental institution from OAU to AU in 2002 can be taken as the most 
crucial initiative from inside. On the other hand, there are many other initiatives from institutions, 
countries, regional blocs and even individuals towards addressing the „development‟ need of Africa 
as a region. To mention few, the Long Term Perspective Study by WB (1992), Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development – TICAD (1993)by Japan and UN/UNDP, Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) by the US (2000), the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (2000), the 
Summit of Heads of State of Africa and France by France, The G8 Africa Action Plan (2002), The 
Blair Commission (2004) by Tony Blair , and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) by the 
EU. Almost all of these initiatives share the mainstream idea of development which is highly 
influenced by neo-classical economics. This mainstream perspective of „development‟ conceptualizes 
the issues of societal relations, processes and outcomes „… as the sum of discrete, intentional acts by 
autonomous actors who are pre-constituted rather than defined through relations with others‟ 
(Eyben, 2006: 203). Likewise, „development‟ can be achieved only if the profit maximization and 
rationally oriented „natural‟ intention of individuals in pursuing their „stable preferences‟ is attained 
within a naturally coordinated market environment (Johnson, 2009: 5). Hence, privatization, 
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deregulation and liberalization continued to be the dogma of the day and most initiatives were 
framed within the framework of these principles.  
These set of principles have become the mainstream development paradigm particularly after the 
1980s and began to be institutionalized through the stabilization and structural adjustment 
programs. In African context, many countries were subjected to the implementation of these 
principles and policy prescriptions into their economies for the sake of securing financial support to 
deal with the economic crisis of 1980s. Many scholars have argued that the imposition of the SAPs 
on African countries resulted more damage than the intended positive effect of „development‟ and 
„social transformation‟. As some reports argue, in spite of the fact that the adjustment programmes 
were initially introduced as medium-term and emergency majors to tackle the economic crisis in the 
1980s, their execution turned out to be a long term and above all a one-size-fits-all process (SAPRI1, 
2004, p.2).  
The development assumptions that inform the formulation and execution of the SAPs constituted 
the mainstream development paradigm. Indeed, many actors including the WB have admitted the 
shortcomings of the SAPs and its failure to achieve the intended goal and its role in exacerbating the 
situation in many African countries (WB, 1988). But how did the African political economic elite 
react to it? How differently could they conceptualize development in African context?  
Theoretically, the postcolonial school of thought offers a different reading of the world political 
economy and historical narratives which contributed to the emergence of the mainstream thinking 
of development. This „alternative‟ school of thought can be considered as a counter-narrative in its 
uniquely located focus of deliberation. What we have at hand for analysis is not a theoretical 
narrative but rather a pragmatic attempt of winning the development discourse of the continent into 
the hands of Africans. Starting from the labeling of the documents, being „Alternative’ and „New’, has 
a connotation which implicitly positions the documents against the „mainstream’ and/or the „old’. The 
underlying purpose and objective of the thesis is to give a nuanced view on these two documents. 
The historical material conditions, the interest and willingness of the political economic elite that 
facilitated the emergence of these documents is thoroughly discussed and analyzed. The core line of 
analysis that informs the inquiry is how differently the documents could conceptualize the equation 
                                                          
1
 The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network 
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of development in Africa‟s context? What issues are prioritized in addressing the development need? 
By juxtaposing these conceptualizations and problematizations against the mainstream development 
discourse, the „altenative-ness‟ and „new-ness‟ of the AAF-SAP and NEPAD will be examined.    
Research Objective and Questions 
Research Objective 
o To critically analyze the AAF-SAPs and NEPAD in their origin and capacity to 
conceptualize the development need of Africa differently than previous initiatives 
 
o  To identify and explain the continuities and discontinuities of governing ideas in 
conceptualizing development in the African political economy in post Cold War 
Africa 
Research Questions 
o How differently could the African political economic elite have drafted the 
„development‟ endeavor of the continent from the mainstream ideas?  
Sub Questions 
o What makes the AAF-SAP an „Alternative’ to SAP? 
o What makes NEPAD „New‟ in the 21st Century political economy? 
Research Methodology 
The theoretical framework within which the research question is being examined problematizes the 
notion of „development‟ at various levels. The concept of development is analyzed as a theoretical 
orientation, as a discursive practice, as an ideological tool and above all as a knowledge framework. 
For the sake of dwelling into this analysis and setting both an exploratory and explanatory analytical 
framework, critical discourse studies will be used as the main „perspective‟ guiding the research. One 
of the main proponents of critical discourse analysis/studies, Van Dijk, argues that, this critical 
approach is beyond a critical analysis but also involves critical „theory‟ and critical „application‟ and it 
is misleading to take it as a method (Van Dijk, 2009: 62). Rather he insisted that it is a „… critical 
perspective, position or attitude‟ which constitute part of the multidisciplinary discipline of 
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Discourse Studies (ibid). Hence, Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) is a better description than Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). Furthermore, he contends that the core point of interest for CDS is to 
identify the way in which „discourse (re)produces social domination‟ (ibid, 63). The exercise and 
relations of power which resulted domination and subordination, contestation and resistance among 
social actors are the core issues of focus for CDS.   
 
 A discourse can be understood as „… an interwoven set of language and practice – discursive practice 
…’ with actors and owners (proponents of the discourse) making a claim, a meaning, producing 
knowledge(s), setting intellectual framework and influencing (Gasper and Apthorpe, 1996, 4) Within 
the perspectives of CDS, the abstract notions and manifestations of power and power relations are 
located in the text and context of a discourse. A text is taken as a manifestation of “… social action 
which again is widely determined by social structure‟ (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10). The leading 
scholars of CDS claim that, adopting CDS as a tool needs an “… interdisciplinary work in order to 
gain proper understanding of how language functions in constituting and transmitting knowledge, in 
organizing social institutions or exercising power” (ibid: 7). Moreover, in asserting the feature of 
CDS, it is not about making an abstract description of a text and a discourse rather to analytically 
explain how language is being used in the social and political context, how its use is extended into 
the realm of producing knowledge and explaining power relations (domination and resistance) (Van 
Dijk, 2009). And this can be done only if the „intricate relationships between text and context‟, is 
aptly theorized (ibid).  
 
One of the basic features of CDS is the explicit position of the researcher in analyzing and studying 
both the text and the context. Almost all the scholars of CDS agree that „[T] here is no as such an 
„objective‟ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what is „there‟ in 
the text without being „biased‟ by the „subjectivity‟ of the analyst‟ (Fairclough 2003: 14-15, as quoted 
in Flowerdew (2008)). But there is no consensus whether CDS(A) should be considered as an 
approach, a theory or a method. Scholars like Wodak and Meyer emphasize on the methodical 
contribution of CDS, whereas Fairclough argues that it is also a theory that connects the social with 
the linguistic. On the other hand, Van Dijk differs in introducing the elements from social 
psychology into the foreground and talks about „socio-cognitive approach‟ where the interplay 
between texts and contexts determines how individuals interact and communicate (ibid). 
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CDS will enable the research to have a simultaneous focus in addressing the research problem while 
focusing on the two documents (AAF-SAP and NEPAD). First of all, it will help to have an in-
depth understanding of the documents, the stated and unstated assumptions, categorization and 
identification of the “development” problems of the continent, the priorities and the neglect of facts 
and realities within the continent and above all the conceptualization of “development” both as a 
discourse, ideology and practice. In addition to that, CDS will also help to situate the production of 
the texts within a context which is structural and ideological with several un-equal actors assuming 
different roles and commanding power of „domination and resistance‟.    By doing so, the material 
and ideational factors that triggered, initiated and influenced the realization of the documents in 
their present form, the inter-play among different actors in the process of producing the documents, 
and the assumed and assigned roles they have will be addressed. 
Scope of the Study 
This study is entirely based on secondary data. Nearly six months of archival research at the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Union (AU) libraries in Addis 
Ababa was conducted. An attempt to interview key officials that have had influential role both at the 
AU and UNECA was not successful. But by limiting the scope of the research and the research 
question to the analysis of the text and the context helped to adjust the balance of the research. 
Hence, initial research questions which were intended to be answered by leading officials are 
dropped and the focus remained on the texts and the context. 
The other main scope of the study is related to the purpose of the research. Though a lot can be said 
about the effectiveness of the two development documents and the implementation strategies, 
programs and practices; the objective of the research is specifically on the conceptualization of 
development in the documents. It is totally beyond the purpose of this specific research to evaluate 
the impact of either AAF-SAP or NEPAD in addressing the development needs of Africa. Rather it 
is a genuine attempt of critically examining the discursive and rhetorical claim of these two 
documents in providing a unique development perspective for Africa‟s pursuit of development. In 
doing so, an attempt is made to avoid a policy evaluation approach by focusing on the ideas and 
arguments that build the documents‟ central features. 
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Chapter Two  
The Notion of  ‘Development’ 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical orientations that inform the entire analysis and arguments in 
the thesis through a brief literature review. Since the thesis is mainly concerned with the idea of 
„development‟ and how it has been conceptualized and operationalized in the political economy of the 
continent from 1989-2009, the theoretical underpinnings that have influenced the „development‟ 
policies & practices will be presented and analyzed. Moreover the thesis has also an exploratory 
nature in identifying the possible alternative theoretical insights towards conceptualizing 
„development‟. Hence, the alternative theoretical arguments and the related literatures will be 
presented and reviewed appropriately. 
The core point of departure and analysis is the concept of ‘development’, which has been one of the 
most contentious concepts in the field of social science. The theorization of development, the 
perspectives being employed in theorizing, the ontological and epistemological positions assumed in 
theorizing, the implicit and explicit influence of these positions in informing the practice of 
development at the ground level are major entry points in making a nuance. The priorities that are 
taken into consideration in the discourse of achieving development, the different levels of 
problematizing the situation at hand and the remedies forwarded with respect to realizing the 
„development need‟  will be discussed. This is therefore an attempt to shade light on these issues in a 
way that sets a valid ground to locate the subsequent chapters. 
2.1 Conceptualizing and Theorizing Development 
Asking „what is development?‟ certainly instigates a very complicated response. However, the 
concept is apparently present almost in all social science fields. In an attempt of showing the broader 
insights of understanding theories of „development‟, Preston (1996) depicted the foundational points 
of social theorizing from the philosophical point of view. According to his argument, every attempt 
of social theorizing is a combination of understanding the nature of the social world (ontology), 
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enquiring the knowledge with respect to the social world (epistemology), implementing certain means 
of pursing this knowledge (methodology) and finally to use this knowledge about the social world 
through a practical action (practice) of agents (Preston 1996, p. 3-4).   The combination of these four 
strands of social theorizing is very helpful in demystifying the broader frameworks that inform the 
intellectual exercise in producing ideas.  According to Preston, the ontological position that one 
assumes has a direct impact in determining the subsequent epistemological and methodological 
positions. With regard to the social world, as it is mostly argued, there are two distinct spheres where 
the ontological ground of social theorists is located. These are: „the realm of material causes‟ and „the 
realm of meanings and understanding‟ (ibid, p. 4). The earlier position denotes that the social world 
can be studied and examined like the natural science method through „… naturalistic description and 
explanation of observable human behavior‟. On the contrary, the other realm argues that the best 
way to grasp the nature of the social world is through interpretation of meanings of social world and 
understanding the immensely diversified nature of humanity. With regard to the naturalistic 
intention of examining the social world, the knowledge enquiry (the epistemology) process is value-free 
and objective where the „social scientific observer‟ is expected to be significantly detached from 
context. Unlike the former one, the pursuit of knowledge within the second realm is interpretative, 
open to subjective maneuver and explanations to make a critical reflection and from a value-laden 
position. From the philosophical point of view, these two epistemological commitments and 
positions are called „empiricism‟ and „rationalism‟.  Empiricism is a philosophical disposition which 
argues that knowledge is fundamentally acquired through experience whereas rationalism gives 
unprecedented priority for thought as a fundamental source of knowledge. Of course, most of the 
philosophical explanations about the social world are a combination of the two positions (ibid, p. 4-
8). 
Taking these „basic‟ philosophical arguments as a starting point will help us to show the underlying 
and somehow implicit inclination of the various theoretical orientations towards the core concept, 
and indeed controversial, of the thesis, „development’. One of the embedded notions within the 
concept of development is the inevitability of „social change‟. And the critical question to put 
forward is about the nature of the social change, the elements being considered in realizing the social 
change and in general the „ethics of social change‟ as well as the „meanings of social change‟. Since 
ideas are produced and implemented within the frequently changing social realm, the „ethics‟ and 
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„meaning‟ of the social change (development) have been also changing across time. This change also 
entails the change in the actors and the methods being used in materializing the ideas.  
According to some scholars, the post „WWII‟ era is the period where the present notions of 
„development‟ become both a political and intellectual agenda in the social world (Escobar, 1995; 
Nederveen, 2001). The power position of the actors who had influenced the notion of 
„development‟ at that point of time, the continuing influence and counter balancing of the influence 
by different actors makes the theoretical attempts of explaining development very complex. Indeed, 
a certain point of ontological position is needed to conceptualize development one way or the other 
and the epistemological, methodological positions will follow to inform the practice. But all these 
things are not happening within a vacuum. The epistemological position adopted to make sense of 
the reality of the social world does not only echoes or reflect the reality but also constructs and 
shapes reality (Nederveen, 2001, p.2). The political nature of knowledge in shaping, determining and 
influencing perceptions, policies and agendas at all levels is used as a premise to argue that 
development theory is an ideology and a „ … by–product of political process and not an intellectual 
process…‟ (ibid, p.3) Of course, it does not make sense to disentangle the theory and practice of 
development from political process but as the same time it is not analytically convincing to reduces 
it to a mere political ideology. According to Nederveen and Corbridge, development theory and 
practice is influenced by both politics and intellectual engagement in different contexts (ibid). 
Reinforcing the implicit notion of „social change‟ within this debate, what constitutes change which 
is assumed to be a „positive change‟ and its appropriateness significantly varies according to class, 
culture, historical context and relations of power (ibid).  
Within the social sciences, knowledge, power, theory and ideology can hardly be isolated in 
analyzing the social world. And the concept of „development’ is also not an exception with this regard. 
The subsequent sections will attempt to show the conundrum of „development’ at four levels and how 
it has been treated in the intellectual arena in terms of theoretical orientations, and how this 
orientations and conceptualization has been influencing practices of development both as an 
ideology and as a discourse.  
The notion of development can be analyzed within a broad meta-theoretical framework. Starting from 
such level helps to grasp „the foundational and ethical assumptions‟ (Johnson, 2009, p.4) that will 
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help to analyze the social world. According to Johnson, „Meta-theory’ is „theory about theory‟ where 
the ontological and epistemological questions are given more focus (ibid). As it is argued earlier, the 
ontological and epistemological dispositions have an immense influence in pre-determining the ideas 
we base our insight at the formative stage of our perspectives. On the other hand, „theory’ can be 
understood as a „coherent body of generalizations and principles associated with the practice of a 
field of inquiry‟ (Chilcote 1994: 367, as quoted in Johnson, 2009). Theories on the other hand do not 
stand alone rather create a certain kind of perspective which is used as an entry point towards 
addressing the social inquiry. And this process of enquiry has its own subjects and objects which are 
produced through the practice. In such cases, according to Foucault, „discourse or discursive practices‟ are 
created as „… (a) historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and 
objects‟ (Foucault 1972: 49). In other words, discourse is a result of certain systems of social 
interactions and practices involving different actors which usually adhere to specific purpose and 
interests, henceforth, the construction and practice of discourse is inherently an exercise and relation 
of power (Howarth 2000: 9). Moreover, „ideology’ can be understood as a „coherent and 
comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand 
their place in society and provides a program for social and political action,‟ (Ball and Dagger 2004: 
4, as quoted in Johnson 2009). 
At this point, analyzing the concept of ‘development’ in terms of these four levels, does not mean that 
they are mutually exclusive rather the main intention is to show how one is the integral and 
constitutive part of the other in different contexts and to illuminate on the complex web of 
interaction both at the idea and practice level. The changing features of „development’ across time, the 
different agents assuming leading role in constructing knowledge, materializing the theories, 
ideologies and discourses, and the interaction and contestation among various actors makes the 
explanation and description of „development’  a difficult task. 
2.2 The Complexities and Dilemmas of ‘Development’ 
 2.2.1 Modernization and Dependency Theories 
In many academic literatures about „development‟, W.W.Rostow‟s work by the title Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960) is mentioned as an influential point of reference both for 
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the mainstream and critical reflections on the history of theories about development. The work of 
Rostow comes into the scene in the „post WWII‟ era where the ideals of modernization theory were 
the influential narratives of development. In the political economic sphere, the US was assuming 
hegemonic status.  It is also a period where structural functionalism has become the mantra of the 
intellectual discourse. Structural functionalism asserts that societies all over the world are essentially 
the same in their functions but differ in terms of which structures within society perform these 
functions (Hyden, 1994, p. 315). Hence, for the sake of achieving modernity, non-Western societies 
need to abandon the structures and value systems they have and replace them with structures and 
value systems of the „Advanced Capitalist Countries‟ (Chambua, 1994,, p. 37)   The nature of the 
world was understood from a very empiricist point of view where the intellectuals of that time were 
applauded for their „value-free‟ interpretation of the social context and the remedies they provided in 
addressing the challenges. As it is argued in the work of Rostow, development is a linear process of 
evolution to be realized stage-by-stage (1960). It is taken for granted that once the ideas and 
practices of the Western world are transplanted into any kind of non-Western context, the final 
stage of growth will be attained ultimately (ibid). At the same time, this is the foundational period 
where development was solely interpreted within the context of economic growth. With regard to 
the ethics of social change, the „Western‟ ethics was taken as superior, and anything „traditional‟ was 
regarded as „backward‟. Moreover, the meaning attached to „development‟ was a process of „catching 
up‟, „an uphill ladder‟, a notion of progress and modernization.  
In terms of Nederveen‟s conceptualization of „dimensions of development theories‟ (Nederveen, 
2001, p.8), the historical and political context of the Cold War period which also witnessed the other 
universalist mission of Marxist theory from the east is a crucial element in considering the dominant 
assertions of the period. And the basic explanation (assumption) being considered is the notion that 
achieving economic growth will ultimately benefits everyone given the growth will „trickle down‟. 
Within this context, the central government is given a leading role in achieving the aspired level of 
„development‟ and modernization. The epistemological and methodological position assumed is clearly 
empiricist given that the social world is treated from a naturalistic and deterministic stand point 
where there is no room for a different interpretation rather to follow a linear trajectory. Depicting 
„development’ in such framework has also a clear, sometimes subtle, action of representation where the 
„Western‟ ethic, political and economic structure and ideas were privileged against the backdrop of 
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the non-Western whose „traditional‟ values and norms were blamed for its „backwardness‟. By 
sticking to this representation of the „other‟, the imagination that was intended to be achieved through 
the desired social change was a changing societal structure in which the malaise of 
„underdevelopment‟ are addressed with the future looking so bright.  The strategies forwarded include 
policies of industrialization, social projects on education and health, and mechanization of 
agriculture by a centralized government.  
The structural functionalism inspired project of achieving „development‟ and modernization at the 
same time failed to materialize its promises for various reasons.  And during the mid-60s, it was 
seriously challenged by the criticism from every angle. Among these, Eurocentric disposition of the 
modernization theory was the major critique which shapes the „one size fits all‟ prescription of the 
theory towards the modernization and „development‟. Among the major critics of the modernization 
theory include scholars like Andre Gunder Frank and his school of thought, „the Dependency 
Theory‟, which argued that the nature of relationship and interaction among countries in the world 
as the main cause of not achieving „development‟. 
By adopting a neo-Marxian analytical framework, Dependency theory located the problem of 
development within the global context of the relation between „the core and the periphery‟. In the 
words of the main proponents, Castells and Laserna (1989, 535), „Dependency refers to an 
asymmetrical, structural relationship between social formations, such that the dependent society (ies) 
is shaped to a large extent by the social dynamics and interests generated in the dominant society 
(ies).‟ The dependentista school of thought emerged in the context of critiquing the earlier attempts of 
achieving development, economic growth (Import Substitution Industrialization –ISI) and 
modernization. Some scholars like Ilan Kapoor even argue that it is „…counter –modernist and 
critical of Western liberalism‟, which questions the explanation of the rest of the world by centering 
Europe and North America as departure point (2008, 9). The core arguments of this school of 
thought can be summarized with its main assertions that the process of bringing „development‟ at 
the core is achieved at the expenses of maintaining „underdevelopment‟ of the periphery (Frank, 
1967; Rodney, 1973). Development does not take place in a predetermined framework and hence 
not in a single direction. For the sake of achieving development countries at the periphery (Latin 
America and Africa) need to „delink‟ from the political economic system of the world which is 
unequally structured to the advantage of countries at the core (Western Europe and North America) 
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(Castells and Laserna, 1989). Indeed, some argue that the insight from the Dependentistas is used as an 
additional factor to establish a command and state led economy under the ideology of socialism.  
On the other hand, the Dependency school itself is criticized for maintaining an „Orientalist‟ 
mentality in its analysis. This is manifested by taking capitalism as the ultimate framework of analysis 
rather than the representation of the non-Western societies within the system. The binary opposition 
which is used as the analytical framework of the theory: „core – periphery‟, „developed – 
underdeveloped‟, „metropole – satellite‟ are valid attempts of trying to locate the problem of 
development from the other perspective („non-western‟) but with limited engagement of 
deconstructing the power relation that exists, according to Kapoor (2008, 10). Moreover, Immanuel 
Wallerstein have also expanded on the ideals of dependency theory to build the „World System‟ 
theory where he located the emergence of the global capitalist system to the 16th century and the 
existence of the unequal power relations among the actors which belong to different world systems 
that co-exist within the broader context (1976). 
Modernization theory and dependency school perspectives give us a general insight how the idea of 
„development‟ come into being and illustrated with in the historical dynamism of Post “WWII‟. The 
changing features of the dominant narratives, the manner in which the conceptualization differs and 
the nature of core variables taken into consideration makes the explanation a non-ending attempt. 
This continued effort of depicting the courses of achieving development continued after these two 
prior perspectives with greater intensity and depth. And the following sections will briefly discuss 
these attempts. 
 2.2.2 The State vs Market Dichotomy 
The unique historical phenomena that happened in the 1970s and 80 across the world gave rise to a 
different orientation towards managing the global political economy. The dominant discourse that 
came out during this period informing the conceptualization and practice of development is the 
neoliberal paradigm. In spite of the wide use of the term neoliberalism in the academic world, as 
many other social science terms, conceptualizing it in a comprehensive manner is not an easy task. 
Some define it as a theory constituted of different concepts and ideas in managing the economic 
system, whereas others define it as a set of policies for economic governance. For instance, Harvey 
defines neoliberalism as „… a theory of political economic practices that proposes the human well-
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being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade.‟ 
(Harvey, 2005, p.2) Some associate their definition of neoliberalism mainly to the rise of Margaret 
Thatcher (1979-1990) in the UK and Ronald Regan (1981-1989) in the US who are believed to play a 
significant role in influencing the role of the World Bank and the International Monterey Fund 
policies and programmes. Accordingly, these change of policies and programmes were incorporated 
into what is known as the „Washington Consensus‟ to guide the economic policies and development 
programmes of countries across the world (Harvey, 2005, p.1-4). There are also others who argue 
that neoliberalism is beyond a theory and a set of policies rather better explained in terms of ideas 
which are used to define and articulate the social world. It is a response to the crisis on the 70s and 
80s by restructuring society and politics by extending the values, principles and relations of the 
market as a guiding instrument (Gill, 2000, p.4). Andrew Gamble further argues that neoliberalism 
emerged as hegemonic idea by anchoring itself into the ideals of economic liberalism and refuting 
the assumptions of Keynesian perspectives of the 50‟s and 60s. The remedies it has provided for the 
high-inflation and unemployment rate in the Western economies through the free-market principles 
gave it a control in informing both the political economy and political ideologies (Gill, 2000; 
Gamble, 2001) Hence, it emergence should be seen beyond the people or the institutions per se (Gill, 
2000). Such kind of understanding neoliberalism as an ideational process can be seen in contrary to 
the other way understanding its emergence in the world political economy as an inevitable phase of 
the capitalist system and pursued by the interest of people who benefit from the process (ibid). 
Later on, neoliberalism has become a dominant framework of managing the global political 
economy translated into specific policy recommendations. These policy recommendations are set to 
be re-organize the relation between labor and capital mainly to the advantage of the later in ensuring 
the interest of the capitalist elite (Gamble, 2001, p. 75-76). In discussing the practical development 
policy manifestations of the Washington Consensus, Dani Rodrik puts it in a nutshell that it is about 
how to “… get the macro balances in order, take the state out of business, and give markets free 
rein. Accordingly, „stabilize, privatize and liberalize‟ became the mantra of a generation of 
technocrats…‟ (Rodrik 2006, p.973) Almost in the same line of explanation, neoliberalism is often 
defined in terms of the state vs. market dichotomy where the incorporation of neoliberal policy 
prescriptions is associated with the rolling back of the state from providing public services and 
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letting the market playing a major role in the entire process under the watchful eyes of the state. 
Indeed, such kind of understanding neoliberalism in simple dichotomy of the state and the market 
might cover some other crucial issues that play vital role in maintaining the belief. Hence, the ideas 
informing the decision of the actors, the interests and expectation of the actors in adhering to 
certain principles of achieving socio-economic development and political transformation need to be 
taken into consideration as well. David Harvey‟s analysis of identifying neoliberalism either as 
„utopian or political project‟ is worth mentioning here. In his analysis, Harvey argues that 
neoliberalism can be considered as a utopian project of re-establishing and re-organization of the 
world capitalist system mainly after the economic crisis in the 1970s and 80s. He strongly contends 
that it is also a political project of restoring the power of certain economic elites by boosting their 
capital accumulation within the international capitalist system (Harvey, 2005, p.19).Such ways of 
problematizing the notion of neoliberalism beyond a simple dichotomy of expression in terms of 
state vs market gives more room to maneuver so that its different manifestations and features can be 
incorporated in its analysis. 
 2.2.3 The Postcolonial (Decolonial) Critique of Development 
The attempt of achieving „development‟ following different models, theoretical orientations and 
practical actions for more than have a century and on the other hand the continuing misery and 
vicious circle of problem could no longer be accepted to certain group of scholars. Hence, by 
building up the previously started efforts of the Critical Thinking tradition, there has been a 
continuous challenge on the mainstream epistemological framework that has been informing the 
theory and practice of „development‟. The challenging position within the Critical Thinking tradition 
significantly differs from other critiques on the orthodox tradition like poststructuralism, 
postmodernism, existentialism and phenomenology by providing „… politically relevant alternative 
…(and) by maintaining a non-dogmatic perspective which is sustained by an interest in 
emancipation form all forms of oppression …‟ (Bronner and Kellner, 1989, 2). The critical reflection 
is not intended to throw all kinds of attack against all kinds of thoughts in undifferentiated manner 
or to assume a simplistic relativistic or nihilistic position of reflection rather to seek for „… an 
emancipatory alternative to the existing order‟ (ibid).  
The central point of departure for the postcolonial (henceforth, decolonial) thinking is interpreting 
colonialism, modernity, development, and the associated knowledge and exercise of power from the 
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„Other‟ perspective (Escobar, 1995; Santos, 2006; Kapoor, 2008; Grosfoguel, 2008). By doing so, it 
tries to problematize, reinterpret and critically reflect on the relationship that involves the interaction 
of the colonizer and the colonized, the hegemon and the subaltern, the West and the Third World. 
Decolonial thinking is also a political action intending to „… disrupt hegemonic power in all its 
forms‟ (Kapoor, 2008, xiv). Disrupting the hegemonic power structure with the intention of 
providing a viable alternative framework requires a higher level of engagement which is at the 
epistemological level i.e. at the level of producing knowledge. Hence, there is a firm position among 
decolonial thinkers against a knowledge that has been presented as a „universal, neutral, value free 
and objective‟. It is argued that, the hegemonic Eurocentric perspectives which have been informing 
Western philosophical thoughts since the Enlightenment period are construed in such a way that 
they are universally applicable, viable and objectively true paradigms. On the other hand, according 
to decolonial thinkers, knowledge is always situated and located within a particular power structure 
like class, gender, race, geography, spiritual or linguistic which in turn is inherently hierarchical 
(Grosfoguel, 2008;  Mignolo, 2000; Walsh, 2007).   
According to Grosfoguel, the hegemonic knowledge framework achieved its status of being 
universal and value-free by concealing the „locus of enunciation‟ from where this knowledge 
emanates from. The Western philosophical and scientific positions have always a „non-situated‟ and 
„non-political‟ subject. By delinking the location of the subject that speaks within the hierarchical 
power structure (class, gender, geography, spiritual and linguistic), the Western philosophy and 
science has achieved to create „ … a myth about a truthful universal knowledge…‟(Grosfoguel, 2008 
3). This epistemic position of the hegemon western knowledge is used as a crucial element in 
creating a hierarchy of knowledge and hence of people within the colonial system. For instance, 
Grosfoguel argues that the characterization and categorization in the mainstream socio-historical 
and political features of the world like the 16th century “people without writing” to the 18th and 19th 
century notion of “people without history”, to the 20th century assertion of “people without 
development” and within the current dominant discourse of the 21st century “people without 
democracy”, is a typical reflection of creating the „other‟ from the vantage point of claiming a 
universalistic knowledge framework(ibid). Nevertheless, questioning the position from which 
knowledges are produced - the „epistemic location‟ and problematizing it within the social structure 
which is mediated by power - the „social location‟ should not lead to a simplistic conclusion that 
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those who are in the oppressed end of the power relation are always producing knowledges from a 
different epistemological framework. Rather, it should be noted that one of the manifestations of 
the power of the hegemon thinking is making the oppressed think within the same epistemological 
framework as the dominant ones. Hence, it does not necessarily mean that a subordinate „social 
location‟ will automatically ensures a critical „epistemic location‟ to the hegemonic knowledge 
framework (Grosfoguel, 2008; Fanon, 1967) 
The epistemic critique of decolonial thinking is also extended to the basic understanding of world 
history particularly in terms of modernity and coloniality. For postcolonial thinkers, coloniality and 
modernity cannot be disentangled rather one is the constitutive part of the other (Grosfoguel, 2008; 
Mignolo, 2000). By not differentiating one from the other (modernity from coloniality), they 
analytically address the power relation that exists in representing the „other‟ and critically analyzing 
the narratives of modernity/coloniality not only from the European perspective but also from the 
„other‟ perspective. At this point, it is also crucial to understand the concept of coloniality which is not 
equivalent to colonialism. According to the decolonial thinking, decolonization should not be 
equated with the absence of colonial administration which leads to the idea of the “postcolonial” 
world. Rather what should be noted is the impact of more than 500 years of power relations and 
structure at the global level between the West and the „other‟ which can hardly be removed by a the 
physical decolonization of Africa roughly 50 years ago and of Latin America a bit earlier. The 
termination of the physical military presence of the colonizer is the transition from “global 
colonialism” to “global coloniality”.  Global coloniality is mainly manifested in the lingering 
domination and subordination that exists within the global system of governance and the 
„international division of labor‟ (Grosfoguel, 2008; Wallerstein, 1995). Hence, coloniality (coloniality 
of power) is an analytical concept that helps to articulate the continuity of the colonial forms of 
power relations after „decolonization‟ that is manifested through colonial cultures and structures (like 
the IMF and WB) of the present day global political economy (Grosfoguel, 2008; Mignolo, 2000).  
The other vital orientation from the postcolonial perspective that triggers further analytical reflection 
is the work of Santos (2006), where he asserted the position of other scholars in a plausible manner. 
Santos argues that, 
Neo-liberal globalization is presided over by techno-scientific knowledge, and owes its hegemony to 
the credible way in which it discredits all rival knowledges, by suggesting that they are not 
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comparable, in terms of efficiency and coherence, to the scientificity of the market laws. Since neo-
liberal globalization is hegemonic, no wonder that it anchors itself in the knowledge, no less 
hegemonic, of Western-based modern science. (ibid: 13) 
The critical examination of Santos in questioning the epistemological superiority of Western 
perspectives is not limited to the simple denunciation of the hegemon per se; rather he illuminated on 
the features and manifestations of the hegemonic knowledge and the alternatives provided through 
the Sociology of Absence. The central point of Sociology of Absence is its assertion that „… what does 
not exist is in fact actively produced as non-existent, that is – as a non-credible alternative to what 
exists‟ (ibid: 15). Departing from this emancipatory epistemological position, Sociology of absence 
intends to influence the hegemon knowledge framework by making the invisible and the concealed 
into visible and viable perspectives. In his analysis of the sociology of absence, Santos identified five 
monocultures that produce the possible alternative as non-existent by discrediting its viability within 
the existing modern, techno-scientific and capitalistic world system (ibid: 15-29).2   
According to Santos, the „most powerful‟ system of discrediting any feasible alternative from the 
scene lies on the monoculture of knowledge which takes modern science the related culture as the 
sole framework of producing knowledge and aesthetic values. To make itself the only means of 
acquiring knowledge, it produces the non-existent in the form of „ignorance and lack of culture‟. The 
work of Grosfoguel in identifying the Western philosophy/knowledge with its unspoken and 
unidentified point of enunciation can be associated with this monoculture of superior knowledge 
which is presented as non-political and „sole criteria of truth‟. The other logic which asserts that 
history has a „… unique and well-known meaning and direction…‟ is presented in the monoculture 
of linear time. Adherence to such kind of deterministic framework of temporality has been 
manifested through different conceptions like “pre-modern, underdeveloped, backwardness” and 
the like.  The other critical insight by Santos under the monoculture of capitalist productivity and 
efficiency contends that the neoliberal world order is nothing but a process of ensuring growth 
                                                          
2
 The five monocultures are: the monoculture of knowledge and rigor of knowledge, the monoculture of linear time, the 
monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity and efficiency, the monoculture of the universal and the global and 
the monoculture of naturalization of differences. According to Santos, each monoculture needs to be changed into an 
„ecology‟ which accommodates other epistemological orientations. Hence, he identified five ecologies, corresponding to 
the monocultures. These are: the ecology of knowledges, the ecology of temporalities, the ecology of productivities, the 
ecology of trans-scales and the ecology of recognitions (See Santos, 2006)  
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through market forces. This is realized by controlling the both nature and human labor to the laws 
of the market and non-stop pursuing of profit (ibid). 
2.3 Problematizing Development: summary and analytical framework 
The previous section briefly illuminated on the dynamic nature of the notion of development. The 
complicated features are associated with the historical political economy, the rise and fall of 
theoretical orientations, and above all the analytical insights employed in conceptualizing what 
constitutes „development‟ and explaining why. The central arguments of the major perspectives 
briefly presented may seem valid explanations in different time and contexts. But what holds right in 
a specific context and time is not necessarily related to the validity of the explanation. There are 
other social and political forces that detect the manner in which certain ideas are positively 
entertained into the practical world or simply overlooked. Hence, theories and perspectives of 
„development‟ do not necessarily inform action and practice no matter how succinctly they explain 
the features of the social world.  
Though the explanations given in each development perspectives differs, the factual elements 
considered and the final outcome they intend to achieve is fairly similar. It can be also argued that, 
the manner in which certain elements of the facts in the natural world are taken into consideration at 
the expense of other facts is a decision involving power. For instance, in the case of modernization 
theory why do we go for economic growth which will „trickle down‟, rather than another approach 
that prioritizes the lower base of the social stratum. In the last three decades, when neoliberalism has 
become the dogmatic principle of running the political economy, to what extent were the 
orientations of development intended to ensure addressing inequality as they maintain their 
conviction to economic growth. It is imperative to bear in mind that, the theoretical explanations, 
development policy prescriptions and practical executions are not neutral processes. The interest of 
actors involved in it, the power relation among the actors, the immediate and long-term effect of 
decisions and the like play indispensable role. And all these interests and roles are mediated by 
ideologies, discourses and knowledges that the actors employ to interpret the social world, their 
present situation and the aspired future.  
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Chapter Three  
A Brief  View on the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 
Introduction 
The historical process that has resulted the crafting of the SAPs needs a thorough reflection before 
examining the central philosophies and assumptions the informed the programs. With this regard, 
one may refer back to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
after the end of the „WWII‟ and the mandate given for these institutions. These institutions were 
meant to be the vanguards of the international political economy after the „World War II‟ and were 
given all the appropriate mandates mainly by Western powers. According to Harvey, the Bretton 
Woods institutions including the UN are the embodiment and manifestation of the newly 
constructed new world order (Harvey, 2005 p.10). Along with these institutions, the Keynesian 
school of thought informed the political economy of the Post War countries focusing on the 
achievement of full employment, a state which takes all the responsibilities in ensuring economic 
growth and welfare for its citizens and above all mandated to intervene into the market system in 
cases of market failures to adjust them into normal and fair circumstances (ibid). These assumptions 
and practices fairly coincide with the developmental philosophy of structuralism of the 1950s and 
60s which regards the presence of an interventionist state to achieve development and 
modernization in the so called „Third World Countries‟.  
 
In African context, it was a period of relative economic growth which barely matches the 
expectation of the majority after succeeding in overthrowing the yoke of colonialism. And the 
African states were keen to respond to the aspirations of their people mainly by inducing 
„…investment as a proportion of GDP, more rapid expansion of imports than exports and faster 
expansion of government spending than revenue‟ (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996, p.6). Such kind of 
infatuation with the idea of „development‟ and „modernization‟ facilitated the continuation of a deep 
rooted mentality in the minds of the African people in embracing the Western lifestyle through the 
imports and the facilitation of a state that strives to emulate the political and economic structure of 
the Western countries. The system dully sponsored the creation of a society that ‘produces what it is not 
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consuming and consumes what it is not producing’. Moreover, the balance-of-payment deficit get worse by 
early 1970s to the extent of halting the state sponsored investments and other intervention 
programs.  
 
The other phenomenal incident at the international level, however maintained the already existing 
extravagant system functioning for a while i.e. the availability of abundant petro-dollar in the 
account of international banks and private creditors after in the aftermath of the first Oil Crisis 
(1973). The petro-dollar recycling maintained the booming of donor spending in the African 
countries with the intention of achieving „development‟, the expansion of investment in the 
countries without the necessary cost-benefit analysis of its appropriateness, increase in imports of 
capital goods, increase in incomes and demands among the society which in general was beyond the 
capacity of the existing institutions to handle and operate in a decent manner (ibid). This situation 
would not continue to the early 1980s without the incident of the second Oil crisis (1979-1980) 
which had another significant impact in the global economy both Western and non-Western 
countries. According to John Toye, most of the Western countries like the US, UK and West 
Germany were compelled to introduce their own „structural adjustment‟ programs like cutting 
inflation and other austerity measures in the economy to address their balance-of-payment gap.  This 
had a direct impact on the non-Western countries whose economy is mainly based on producing 
non-durable consumer products and primary commodities to the global market (1994, p. 20).  
 
The economies of most African countries were already in a very fragile condition of macroeconomic 
instability and high indebtedness. They were very much outward oriented and import dependent, 
with weak industries and productive sector, and highly influenced by the availability of the petro-
dollar from banks, donors and private creditors, began to crumble step-by step (Engberg-Pedersen et 
al, 1996, p. 4-8, Toye, 1994, p. 18-21). The role of the state in running the agricultural production 
and market system with its intention of „modernizing‟ the production process did not bring the 
expected outputs, not even to match the subsidy cost to set up central systems of production and 
distribution. On the other hand, the investment in the industrial sector which was under heavy 
protection and partially owned by the state and private/foreign investors were also weak and often 
known for corruption and inefficiency. Moreover, the state was indeed over extended with the huge 
bureaucratic and civil servants in the semi-efficient public sector (ibid). Hence, both the external and 
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internal dynamics were considered as unpleasant situations and triggered the execution of certain 
measures that will address the problems. The decline terms of trade at the global level, the scarcity 
of foreign exchange at national level which is the result of the decrease in aid and funding 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the state to intervene into the agriculture and industry sectors 
to induce incentives which in turn aggravated the situation in the national economy (ibid). 
3.1 Basic Features and Assumptions of the Structural Adjustment Programs 
Having the dogma of pursuing and achieving „development‟ at the center of every intervention and 
the execution of programs, there happened to be a significant difference in setting the priorities, 
problematizing the context and putting the ideas into practice among different actors. For instance, 
the African political economy and its precarious situation as mentioned in the earlier section in the 
1970s and early 80s was perceived and interpreted differently among different actors in explaining 
what is „structural’ about it. There is an argument which locates the structural problems of African 
economies of this period into the historical and colonial context where the economic and social 
imbalances are inherently built into the system and thereby hindering „development‟ to happen. This 
deep-rooted challenge is the one which has a „structural’ impact in the production and distribution 
system (like export oriented production) and the associated sectors like infrastructures (road) and 
other social services. Hence, the journey of realizing „development‟ is a function of „… overcoming 
these structural imbalances (which have a severe impact of) distorting markets, and state 
intervention is suggested to improve structure and so provide the optimal conditions for private 
sector participation‟ (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996, p. 3-4).  
 
On the other hand, other actors mainly the international financial institutions (IFIs) articulated the 
„structural’ problem of African economies in the context of the market distortion that has been 
happening because of the state intervention. In this context, the political economic challenge that 
engulfed the continent is neither the colonial history nor the current integration of the continent 
into the global context rather the measures taken to redress the situation which in turn resulted the 
unforeseen structural problem from extensive intervention of the state into the economy (ibid).  
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This being the glimpse of the difference among the various actors in their effort of addressing the 
„developmental gap‟ of Africa, there lies a puzzling inquiry in understanding the founding 
assumptions of the SAPs. What are the core ideas up on which these policy measures and practices 
have been considered and executed? John Toye (1994) has made an expounded attempt in 
identifying the basic assumptions that have influenced the formulation of the SAPs. Toye argued 
that the basic assumption that structuralism asserts in analyzing the development question in the 
1960s and 70s is by differentiating the structures of the so called „advanced and developed‟ countries 
from those of „Third World countries‟. This orientation of sharp contrast and dualism can be taken 
as a starting point. The intellectual response towards the dualism of structuralism initiated the 
principles of „mono-economics‟, „an economics that was universally applicable – a unified set of 
principles from which policy prescriptions could be drawn and successfully applied in advanced and 
backward countries alike‟ (p.22). This principle, in spite of all the criticisms from all sides, 
championed in establishing the idea of using „standard economics‟ for policy recommendations and 
analysis regardless of other crucial factors. Given the identified political economic challenges that 
happened, the major point of departure in putting to practice the principles of mono-economics was 
addressing the short-run macroeconomic stabilization. The remedies with this regard were money 
supply control, fiscal deficit reduction, devaluation and the removing any kind of price control that 
triggers distortions. In Toye‟s argument, the 1980s structural adjustment is a combination of two 
distinctive categories: „… stabilization and structural adjustment in the narrower sense of market 
liberalization and public sector reform‟ (p.23). In synthesizing the relationship between structuralism 
and mono-economics, Toye argued that structuralism tried to react to the failure of mono-
economics which focus on „stabilization packages‟ without giving due attention to “bottlenecks” and 
“rigidities” that existed in the economies of „Third World Countries‟ (like agriculture, foreign trade 
and government sectors) as it is empirically witnessed in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina (1956-62). 
Structuralism on the other hand has been proven short of remedies in Chile and Peru with its failure 
to recognize the „… imperatives of short-run stabilization‟ by prioritizing „… long term structural 
transformation‟ (ibid). The 1980s structural adjustment programs were, according to Toye, „… 
policies precisely directed to removing the bottlenecks and rigidities …‟ (ibid) which were identified 
by structuralists a few years back. It is based on this assertion that Toye argued, mono-economics is 
not a simple manifestation of monetarism rather an attempt of recognizing the elements of 
structuralism in such a way that a policy framework is created from a supposedly sound position. 
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Hence, „… monoeconomics is a parent of the policies called structural adjustment…‟ (ibid, emphasis 
in the original). 
 
One of the core assumptions of SAPs is the orientation towards the role of the state in the economy 
of a given country. This orientation is rightly illustrated in the argument that calls for the elimination 
of the government from the „… functions of production and finance‟ (Toye 1994, p.24). At certain 
point of time the state was praised for its benevolent engagement with its „interventionist and 
modernist‟ mission so long as it was committed to economic growth. And in Africa‟s context, it was 
more than a simple notion of economic growth rather a legitimate actor of facilitating the „caching 
up‟ process and achieving modernization and „development‟. However, with the changing situations 
that happened in the 70‟s and early 80s, the image of the state started to be portrayed in a way that 
shows its obsession in indulging itself in almost every aspect of societal and economic life. The 
expectation of the people from the state and the reaction of the state in its „over-extension‟ resulted 
in the presence of a huge state machine staffed with inefficient and ineffective bureaucratic system 
(Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996, Himmelstrand et al, 1994, Van Der Hoeven et al, 1994).  
 
The capacity and intention of the state began to be questioned from different angles. One of the 
critical comments was by trying to look at the state through its personnel and individuals that have 
their own interest and priorities to achieve. These interests and priorities are considered having a 
significant impact in informing the decision of the state at least by not violating the benefits and 
immediate interests of the individuals that constitute the state machinery. The other entry point that 
was used by the monoeconomics thought to justify the inefficient role of the state was by following 
the analysis of neo-Marxism. Neo-Marxists argue that the state has an inherent failure to function 
and operate to the interest of the wider society, rather, since it is hijacked by the comprador 
bourgeoisie, it is a system of benefiting the capitalist class and interest groups that have their own 
agenda. As Toye puts it „[T]he state uses economic policy to create rents to appease rent-seeking 
groups, and in so doing it becomes the cause of distorted incentives, wasted resources and 
accumulating economic failure‟ (Toye, p.24). Such kinds of strong assumptions against the state are 
used to generalize the features of the „bottlenecks‟ and „rigidities‟ that need to be removed in the 
stabilization and adjustment programs. Hence, the simplest and logical remedy was to „roll back‟ the 
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state and create an enabling environment for the private sector for the intended efficiency and 
effectiveness in the economic sector.   
 
In general terms, the basic assumptions of the structural adjustment programs were operationalized, 
as Dani Rodrick puts it, in the „Stabilize, privatize and liberalize‟ conviction of the IMF and the WB 
(Rodrick 2006, p.973). Most African countries were made to become subscribers to these policy 
orientations to get financial support from the IMF and the WB to sustain their economy in the 
economic crisis of the 1970s and 80s. The increasing debt crisis that most African countries found 
themselves triggered the formulation and executions of stabilization measures by the IMF as a 
condition to lend short-term balance of payment credits for the countries. The stabilization 
measures mainly include fiscal and monetary policies where the governments were forced to cut 
back subsidies to various social services and programs. These measures were meant to boost the 
savings and foreign exchange reserves of the countries so that they would be able to pay back their 
debts to their creditors. The decisions to follow the stabilization program resulted in various socio-
economic and political repercussions because of the unique feature of the African political economic 
structure which was overlooked by the monoeconomics principles of the IMF. It is at this point, 
according to the SAPRI3 Report, that the WB intervene into the business with the intention of 
redressing the social chaos by providing funding for the countries on the condition that the 
countries will carry out long-term changes in the institutional and structural set up of their 
economies (2004, p.2). The Report further argues that „… the structural adjustment policies were 
designed to open markets and reduce the state‟s role in the economy‟ (ibid). And the policies 
include: trade liberalization, privatization of public sectors, marketing boards and state owned 
enterprises, liberalization of domestic markets and deregulation of investments (ibid). And these 
policy measures were unquestionably necessary conditions to be fulfilled by the countries so as to 
access any kind of loan and aid from donors, financial creditors and institutions (ibid, p.4)    
The following schematic representation by John Toye clearly describes the components of the 
structural adjustment programs. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRI)  
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Fig. 3.1: ‘A Schematic Representation of the Structural Adjustment Policy’ adopted from John 
Toye 1994 (p.23)  
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Chapter Four  
The Attempt of  Crafting the ‘Alternative’ 
4.1 Introduction – AAF-SAP (Historical review and emergence) 
The decade of the 1980s was a period of significant historical phenomena in the sphere of 
international political economy. The continuity of major political economy features that shaped the 
decade happened in the previous years and carry on influencing and informing the decisions of 
actors at various levels. The main focus was to address the problem of poverty and realizing 
„development‟ particularly in the so called „Third World Countries‟ by introducing new policy 
recommendations and remedies to the existing challenges. The practical diagnosis made with this 
regard followed by the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) with the 
intention of solving the social, economic and political malaises of these countries.  
 
In Africa‟s context, there have been various attempts in the 1980s aiming towards the same end of 
realizing „development‟ and addressing the problems of poverty and inequality. One can mention the 
widely acclaimed Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the subsequent Final Act of Lagos by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Africa‟s Priority Program for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 
(APPER) by the OAU, and the United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery 
and Development 1986-1990 (UN – PAAERD). In spite of the intention that these initiatives had in 
effecting change in the socio-economic and political spheres of the continent, over 30 African 
countries were in due course of adopting and implementing the „stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs‟ as of 1988 (AAF-SAP, 1989). In October 1988, during the mid-term 
evaluation of the UN-PAAERD there was a recommendation from the UN General Assembly that 
urged African countries to come up with a „ …viable conceptual and practical framework for 
economic structural adjustment programmes in keeping with the long term development objectives 
and strategies at the regional, sub-regional and national levels‟ (UN, 1988). By taking this call as a 
starting point, the UNECA embarked on a mission to undertake a process which involved almost all 
stakeholders to come up with a comprehensive development document to address the crisis. An 
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International Advisory Board composed of 20 African and non-African personalities and higher 
officials from IMF, WB, UNDP and a total of 25 national consultants were given the responsibility. 
The main task assigned to the national consultants was to make a detail examination and analysis of 
the stabilization and structural adjustment programs that have been carried out in their respective 
countries. They were also requested to provide possible alternative insights to the existing political 
economic challenges (Adedeji 1990: p.40)  
 
The compiled draft ideas from the study of the national consultants was presented to an 
international workshop of African and non-African economists in January 1989 which helped to 
produce the first version of the AAF-SAP. This draft document passed through consecutive 
consultation conferences of an intergovernmental group of experts of African Ministries of Finance 
and Central Banks and African Ministers of Finance to incorporate their input into the alternative 
program (ibid). The consecutive meetings and conferences involved African and non-African high 
officials from governments and international institutions and organizations, economists, African 
Ministries of Finance and Ministries of Economic Planning and Development. The final draft of the 
AAF-SAP was adopted at a joint meeting of African Ministries of Economic Planning and 
Development and the Ministries of Finance in Addis Ababa, on April 10, 1989. Finally the 25th 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the Organization of African Unity adopted the 
framework as a continental framework on the 25th of July, 1989 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (AAF-
SAP, 1989, Adedeji, 1990). 
Historically speaking, the lingering political economic structure from the colonial period 
characterized the feature of most African countries in the period after the 1960s. These political 
economic features include an export oriented crop production system, small and largely 
disarticulated industries most of which owned by foreigners, infrastructures (road and rail ways) built 
mainly to fulfill the export oriented crop production and mineral extraction, and also a state that has 
relatively wider apparatus of bureaucracy with the intention of achieving „development‟ with an 
„interventionist-modernizing‟ engagement (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 1996). These political economic 
features in-tandem with the changing international political economic order which had a direct 
impact in the trade balance of the African countries contributed to the creation of a deep rooted 
socio-economic and political problems that triggered and justified the implementation of SAPs. 
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The SAPs that have been implemented under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank were 
initially targeted in addressing the short-term economic challenges of the respective African 
countries. These short term remedies were introduced from an orthodox or classical economic point 
of view/assumption where instruments of controlling money supply, exchange and interest rate 
stabilization, trade liberalization, credit squeeze and the like were taken as appropriate measures 
(ibid). Moreover, the SAPs can be also understood as a mechanism of reducing the role of the state 
in the economic sector by allowing the market to be the main means of allocating resources fairly 
and by implication creating an „enabling environment‟ for the private sector (Engberg-Pedersen et al, 
1996). Most of the initiatives and programs that intended to address the socio-economic and 
political challenges of African countries were not successful enough in bringing tangible change. For 
example the World Bank has carried out its own independent study in assessing the outcome and 
effectiveness of the SAPs it has sponsored and concluded that “improvements in several countries 
have not been sustained … budget deficits have been increasing, especially in the highly indebted 
Sub-Saharan African countries” (WB, 1988). Moreover, the independent study of the Bank has also 
unequivocally asserted that the unique institutional and structural set up of African political 
economy was not taken into consideration at adequate level in executing a general prescription of 
the SAPs which resulted unintended consequences at the end (ibid).  
 
Indeed, the initial criticisms on the central assumptions of the SAPs came from different bodies 
other than IMF and WB. And these institutions have admitted that many of the reservations towards 
SAPs were valid and appropriate. The major criticisms for the SAPs were its short-sightedness in 
addressing the socio-economic challenges of the African countries as well as its „one size fits all‟ 
orientation. Beyond the fierce criticisms, there was also an attempt of addressing the central issue of 
achieving „development‟ in the African context with a different framework of understanding the 
core challenges at hand. With this regard, the significant contribution was made by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).  The initiative which started by the UNECA 
in early 1988 was intended to „… search for an African alternative framework to structural programs 
that would address simultaneously both adjustment and structural transformation problems of 
African economies‟ (AAF-SAP, 1989, p ii).  
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4.2 Brief Overview of the UNECA and its Mandate 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) is established as one of the 
regional entities of the UN in 1958 by the Economic and Social Council of the UN. The prior 
mandate of UNECA is „…to promote the economic and social development of its member States, 
foster intra-regional integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa's development.’4 
In line with its mandate for the socio-economic development of the continent, UNECA embarked 
on the mission to address the fundamental causes of social and economic predicaments of the 
continent in the 1980s. The AAF-SAP is one of its major contributions towards the achieving its 
goal of addressing the socio-economic challenges of the continent. 
4.3 The African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programs for 
Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) 
As it is mentioned earlier the AAF-SAP was formulated by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) through a series of consultations and conferences deliberating on 
the African political economy structure. The consecutive ministerial meetings in the late 1980s with 
respect to evaluating the performance of UN- Program of Action for African Economic Recovery 
and Development (UN-PAAERD) contributed for the emergence of AAF-SAP lately. The UN-
PAAERD was implemented under the auspices of the UNECA in partnership with the OAU to 
achieve a better way of managing the political economy of the continent during the crisis. Realizing 
the objectives of the UN-PAAERD was highly compromised by the stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs of the IMF and WB in the late 1980s.  
 
The exertion of producing the alternative framework in handling Africa‟s political economy is a 
reaction to the pervasive socio-economic and political crisis that the continent has been struggling 
with. This can be also considered as the embodiment of the conviction that some political economic 
elites have not only in providing a remedy to the situation but also to come up with a viable 
alternative roadmap of recovery and transformation (ibid). The AAF-SAP tries to understand and 
analyze the structure of Africa‟s Political Economy and sets some different development objectives 
                                                          
4
 UNECA website accessed on June 21, 2011 (http://www.uneca.org/about_eca/overview_of_eca.htm)   
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to the continent. There is also a section in which a critical evaluation of the stabilization and 
structural adjustment programs is made in their success and failure of providing a solution for the 
continent. Then the document provides the „alternative framework‟ with specific policy directions 
and instruments in-tandem with implementation strategies and monitoring schemes.  
4.2.1 The Rationale of the AAF-SAP  
The leading mastermind behind the formulation of the AAF-SAP, Professor Adebayo Adedeji 
mentioned the rationale of producing the AAF-SAP at that point of time in various occasions. From 
the various explanations given about the purpose of the AAF-SAP two basic elements should come 
out clearly. The first core issue is whether adjustment is necessary for African economies or not. 
Alike the other actors that introduced and imposed the SAPs to the African economies, there is a 
consensus among everyone about the necessity of adjusting the African economic and political 
structure to the changing international political economy and domestic factors. However, the central 
point of departure rests on the question, „what kind of adjustment‟? In answering this question, the 
AAF-SAP started by understanding and analyzing the structural features and paradoxes of African 
political economy and addressing the challenges within a long-term transformational development 
program (Adedeji 1990, p.26). Consequently, the other fundamental issue that AAF-SAP tried to 
portray from the onset is that „… the alternative framework is not a standard program to be applied 
indiscriminately in all countries under all circumstance‟ (AAF-SAP 1989, p.iii). It is, rather, a holistic 
framework of managing the macro-economic decisions, policy orientations, implementation 
strategies and evaluation of long-term transformation development programs formulated by African 
countries by taking into account the specific situations they are found in (ibid).  
 
In his speech addressing the Assembly of the OAU which adopted the AAF-SAP, Professor Adedeji 
raised valid questions in an attempt of taking lessons and experiences from the situation of African 
political economy in the 1980s. The decade has passed through the stabilization measures of the 
IMF and structural adjustment funds of the WB. One of the fundamental questions raised was the 
appropriateness and viability of these measures in bringing the expected results. Policy measures 
were taken to ensure internal and external financial and monetary balances as short-term remedies of 
the crisis. These measures were taken without considering the possibility of implementing long-term 
transformation and development programs. There was a clear dichotomy of setting a short-term 
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development plan at the expense of long-term development programs. The AAF-SAP was an 
attempt of incorporating both the long-term and short-term development goals and commitments in 
a „holistic manner‟. As it is argued, this effort can be operationalized by taking the necessary lessons 
from the practical lived experiences of the African economies in the 1980s (Adedeji 1990, p. 26-30) 
 
One of the core lessons that need to be seriously considered from the 1980s is the indispensability 
of winning the decision of what is best for Africa‟s political economy rather than falling under the 
direct control of the so called „development partners‟. Africa has to set the development priorities, 
goals and objectives initially by considering its interest rather than fulfilling the concern of external 
actors and agencies (Adedeji 1990, p.16). The other crucial lesson in addressing the broader political 
economy challenges of the continent was „the need for consistency and persistence so as to deal 
away with, policy discontinuity‟ (ibid). There was a clear discrepancy between the stated 
commitment of African countries in addressing their common problems and the practical actions 
and measures taken. For instance, the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) came into existence with the total 
consensus of OAU members with the intention of putting into action the practical agreements 
through the Final Act of Lagos (1980). But in reality, most of the African countries were busy with 
their crisis management business during the entire decade of the 1980s executing the stabilization 
measures and adjustment policies under the auspices of the IMF and the WB. Hence, Adedeji was 
calling far persistence and commitment in practical terms if the real challenges are to be dealt with in 
the appropriate manner (ibid). 
 
The wise allocation and utilization of resources within the African economies with a demonstrated 
commitment of meeting the agreed goals and objectives of development was also noted as a lesson. 
This point squarely addressed the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of most African states in utilizing 
the physical, human and financial resources for the benefit of the majority. The extravagant nature 
of the public sector was addressed to avoid the un-productive activities and identified barriers that 
jeopardize efficient use of resources. Likewise, in the effort of ensuring better productivity and 
efficient use of resources, the human capacity development issue came into play. It is witnessed in 
the 1980s that, most of the short-term development programs lack the „human factor‟ in their 
diagnosis and treatment of the African economies. Hence, any development initiative has to anchor 
its principles from the human dimension if it intends to achieve long-term societal transformation 
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and development. According to Adedeji‟s argument, the „human dimension‟ has two components to 
be addressed (ibid p.18). The first one is by building the human capital of societies by ensuring the 
delivery of quality social services (education and health) so that the previous point of productivity, 
efficiency and effectiveness is addressed in an adequate manner. The other component of 
incorporating human dimension into the development perspective is by guarantying the inclusion of 
vulnerable and disadvantaged social groups in the development endeavor. This guarantee might be 
maintained within the adjustment program by „… protection of core budget expenditures on social 
sector programs‟ (ibid). In a nutshell, while stating the purpose of having a new development 
framework Adedeji argues: 
 
What we need is not mere grafting of the social aspects to existing structural adjustment 
programs in order to ameliorate the negative impact of the latter on the fabric of society, ex-
post, but a new fundamentally different approach that will put at the forefront of our 
development effort the human factor (ibid). 
 
Last but not least, the lessons from the 1980s confirmed the timeliness and value of realizing 
„regional economic integration‟. The actual reality that most African countries share in their 
common, the colonial history, weak state and production capacity and disintegrated political 
economic strategies indisputably require a regional integration and cooperation in their effort of 
mobilizing enough resources to realize development. The presence of harmonious policies and 
strategies in managing the political economy of the continent is an enabling factor as well as a vital 
leverage to function in the international forum in areas of trade and investment. 
 
4.2.2 Understanding the African Political Economy 
The initial entry point in crafting the alternative framework was to identify the essential features and 
characteristics of the African political economy. With this regard, the core structures that needed a 
meticulous attention in the endeavor of long-term societal transformation and development are the 
structures of production, consumption, technology, employment and socio-political organization 
(AAF-SAP 1989, par.1). The faulty nature of these structures is the root cause for the prevalence of 
„… mass poverty, food shortage, low productivity, weak productive base and backward technology‟ 
(ibid). It is argued in the document that there has been a serious misconception of limiting the focus 
of African political economy crisis to „… inflationary pressures, instability of export earnings, 
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balance of payment deficits, rising debt burdens…‟ (par.4) and other exogenous factors. These all 
concerns being raised as „structural‟ problems of African economies are considered as symptoms of 
other deep rooted causes which are more „structural‟ than the earlier ones. These include the inability 
of structural transformation in the African economies to cope up with the changing global context, 
the hindering socio-political and physical circumstances that the African economies are functioning 
in and also the unequal orientation towards the outside world which sustains their dependency 
(ibid). Articulating the essential characteristics of African economies and identifying the structural 
features from the pile of problems that the crisis have aggravated helped to cleverly scrutinize the „ 
… enabling and disenabling factors – domestic, external, historical and contemporary…‟ that inform 
the state of „Africa‟s underdevelopment‟ (par.2). 
 
As it is argued in the AAF-SAP, among the various manifestations that are caused by the 
problematic nature of the African political economy, the following can be considered as the most 
important ones (AAF-SAP 1989, p. 2-6): 
 
(a) The predominance of subsistence and commercial activities, mainly characterized for its 
outward orientation and simple trading of imports and exports which also influences the 
same degree of orientation in the service sector like banking and finance 
 
(b) The narrow, disarticulated production base with ill-adapted technology, mainly identified 
with weak inter-sectoral linkage, for example, between the agriculture and manufacturing 
sector. Moreover, the agricultural sector which constitutes the significant majority of the 
productive force and contributing the lion share to the government revenue suffers from 
low productivity, unbalanced outward orientation, exclusion of women from the 
production system as well as weak linkage with the domestic industries 
 
(c) Neglect of the informal sector, in spite of the fact that the informal sector has an 
immense contribution in African economies in the sphere of production, distribution, 
finance and employment, there is a significant neglect and marginalization of the sector 
in institutional policy frameworks and strategies. The discrimination against the sector 
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resulted the failure to harmonize with the supposedly „modern economic‟ system, to 
have low productivity, weak capacity to compete against imported products and limited 
skill capacity with capital constraints.   
 
(d) Environmental degradation, caused by natural and human interaction with the 
environment with serious repercussions to the highly nature dependent economic system 
in causing natural calamities, conflict, drought and famine. 
 
(e) Lopsided Development: unbalanced focus from the state mainly explained in terms of 
urban bias in providing access to social services, distribution of welfare and availability of 
infrastructure 
 
(f) Fragmentation of the African economy, the challenge to synchronize the African 
„product and factor‟ markets which would contribute to the availability of abundant 
resource to by pulling resources together and building the capacity to deal with the 
common problems of African countries. Moreover the nature of the production system, 
both agriculture and industry, with its unbalanced linkage to the international market 
makes it more volatile and unsustainable in responding to exogenous factors 
 
(g) Openness and external dependence, as argued earlier weak structural and institutional 
capacity in the production sector which targets the external market made African 
economies immaturely open to external shocks as well as dependent on the market and 
trade system totally beyond their control. The core point is not intended to argue for an 
isolationist policy, which is very unrealistic and inappropriate, but rather to build the 
domestic capacity first so as to insure the sustainability and viability of the economy to 
survive in the international sphere. Moreover, intra-African trade can also contribute 
positively to the economy 
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(h) Lack of institutional capability, the capacity either to transform the challenged economic 
system into a viable entity is fundamentally hindered by either by the absence or 
inefficiency of appropriate institutions  
 
The AAF-SAP was not limited to analyzing the African political economy and its structural 
dysfunction rather it attempted to set the „alternative framework‟ by including the observable 
challenges in the socio-political structures of the continent. It is argued that the production system is 
inevitably linked with and influenced by the broader societal organization of culture, politics and 
institutions (par.22). In evaluating the impact of the „development‟ process that has been happening 
in the African societies, the AAF-SAP identified the problem associated with „imitative modernism‟ 
which has an impact both on the social structure and economic sphere of African societies. The 
uncontrolled rate of urbanization followed by urban lifestyle and consumption pattern with the 
belief of achieving „modernism‟ thwarted the economic system in creating an outward oriented 
domestic demand. In addition to this, the cultural impact of adopting western values into the 
cultural milieu, the unprecedented preference for foreign expertise, models, standards and goods had 
a deterrent effect in initiating an „…innovative and self-reliant‟ development paradigm. In addition 
to this, democratization and establishing/strengthening the necessary democratic structures and 
institutions in the political system was also considered as one of the structural challenges to be 
addressed. 
 
In general terms, the AAF-SAP extensively engaged with the structural features of the African 
political economy before providing the „alternative framework‟ to the already existing mainstream 
development framework. In doing so, it clearly illustrated that the African political economic 
structure has an inherent problem of generating crisis from its production and consumption system, 
as well as acquiring shocks from the external sphere which also squares back to the domestic 
organization of the political economy. It is this vulnerable and unsustainable pattern of production 
and consumption that has its own internal and external dynamics which created the crisis and treated 
by short-sighted policy measures (SAPs) which ended up aggravating and expanding the problem to 
a further extent.  
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I. Setting the Development Agenda: Problematizing Africa’s Quest 
 
The AAF-SAP set the development objectives that it would like to achieve across the continent 
through the discourse of a previous continental document which intended to achieve a 
comprehensive socio-economic and political transformation of the continent, The Lagos Plan of 
Action (LPA) of 1980. The development strategy that has been utterly described in the LPA gives a 
vital focus for „self-reliant and self-sustaining development‟. The LPA is praised for its inward 
looking and far-sighted attempt of realizing development in the African context. The three core 
elements constituting the LPA were alleviating mass poverty and improving the living standard of 
people, ensuring self-sufficiency in food production, consumption and other essential goods and 
services, and addressing the „balkanization‟ of the continent by facilitating a functional 
interdependence and collective self-reliance of African countries ( par.31). 
 
One of the strong points regarded by the AAF-SAP about the LPA is its comprehensiveness in 
accommodating both long-term developmental and transformational endeavors with short-term 
actions and policy recommendations. By putting the achievement of „self-reliant and self-sustaining 
development‟ as a broader framework of functioning, the LPA produced sound and viable actions to 
be carried out in the short-term context. Nevertheless, all the aspirations of the LAP and the 
practical recommendations illustrated in the Final Act of Lagos (1980) were abandoned when the 
African economies were trapped by the pick of the economic crisis in mid 1980s. The situation 
forced the African countries to choose the stabilization measures by the IMF and the adjustment 
programs by the WB because of the availability of financial support from the institutions to survive 
the economic turmoil. Hence, the comprehensiveness of the LPA finally turned into a dichotomy of 
prioritizing the short-term existence at the expense of the long-term transformation. As it is stated in 
the AAF-SAP, „… many African countries have remained under pressure to cope with only the 
symptoms of the crisis, such as budgetary and external disequilibria, at the expense of leaving the 
fundamental structural causes of the crisis unaddressed‟ (par.33). 
 
The AAF-SAP uniquely explained the structural and institutional development challenges of the 
continent. This entry point in problematizing the challenges and bottlenecks of the African political 
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economy used to frame the development objectives in a different framework. As it is argued in the 
document, the focus of the „alternative framework‟ is to embark on a long-term societal 
transformation and development by addressing the „root causes‟ of the economic crisis. In doing so, 
the development agenda of the AAF-SAP is formulated in line with achieving three broad 
objectives, achieving human centered development, establishing self-sustaining economic growth 
and development, and integrating African economies to achieve national and regional collective self-
reliance.      
 
The objective of sustaining and improving the living standard of African people and guarantying the 
overall well-being of citizens is considered as the ideal and the ultimate goal of the entire 
development endeavor in Africa. In doing so, all the other development objectives were expected to 
directly or indirectly contribute towards this. The AAF-SAP asserts that, it is not from the 
„humanistic or altruistic aspects of development‟ (par.35) that development needs to be human 
centered rather from the core principle that it should be a process that is certainly driven by 
meaningful participation of people. The normative standard set within this framework argues that 
„[D]evelopment should not be undertaken on behalf of a people; rather it should be the organic 
outcome of a society‟s value system, its perceptions, its concerns and its endeavors‟ (ibid). With this 
regard one of the core points of ensuring human centered development is ensuring food self-
sufficiency of African people. The LPA is also very loud in calling for self-sufficiency in food 
consumption and production. Such endeavor needs to reshape or maintain the food consumption 
habit of African people to products that are produced in the continent. Indeed, establishing the 
necessary institutional and infrastructural set up to is also a vital requirement for the attainment of 
this goal. 
 
On the other hand, the extensiveness of the actual crisis in the 1980s needed a swift and practical 
action in line with the long-term objectives. These timely issues that needed immediate action were 
identified as basic needs of the population, goods and services that ensure the well-being of the 
people at a minimum standard. This include: „food, water, shelter, primary health-care and 
sanitation, education and cheap transport‟ for the poor (par.37). The practical remedies that are 
recommended to ensure the accessibility of this minimum standard of living for the poor include: 
ensuring access to the basic factors of production for the poor, mainly land, facilitating the creation 
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of employment opportunities that are targeting the majority of the population, and also establishing 
a fairly improved and enhanced mechanism of reaching the poor through the distribution of national 
wealth. These actions fall both in the short-term and long-term development objective of realizing a 
human centered development. They also required the attainment of certain structural transformation 
in the political economy of African countries so as to ensure their attainment in an effective manner, 
for example the access to land (par.38).  
 
The second component of development objective pointed out by the AAF-SAP was establishing a 
self-sustaining economic growth and development. This objective is directly related to the previous 
objective of improving the living standard of people through a human centered approach. It is 
argued that, the earlier objective cannot be realized unless there is a self-sustained development. And 
this self-sustained development objective includes three specific objectives, namely, (a) maintenance 
of sustained economic growth; (b) transformation of the African economic and social structures; 
and (c) maintenance of a sustaining strong base (par.39). In the AAF-SAP, the economic growth 
aspect of development is directly linked to the existing social structure. The social structure which is 
the constitutive part of the development process is expected to transform into a context where self-
sustained development is attainable. The AAF-SAP document clearly stated this in the following 
manner: 
 
In this context, it is pertinent to emphasize that socio-economic transformation has hitherto tended 
to be equated with a process of economic and social modernization that tries merely to replicate the 
patterns of production, consumption and institutions that prevail in the developed countries. This 
confusion has marred the proper conceptualization, design and implementation of a transformation 
process whose content and parameters are in resonance with African values and realities. This 
somber realization points to the necessity for a new African transformation ethic that incorporates, 
rather than alienates, the present and future African realities – economic, political, social, cultural and 
environmental (par.40) 
 
This „African oriented‟ socio-economic transformation is intended to be realized both at the 
consumption and production level in the long-term development endeavor. In addressing the 
consumption pattern problem of African countries, the AAF-SAP explicitly mentioned that the 
existing trend in most urban areas is „derivative of the value systems of the developed countries‟ 
(par.41). Hence, the objective of achieving self-sustaining economic growth and development 
cannot be attained unless this pattern is changed. It is stated that such kind of outward oriented 
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consumption has a direct impact in the production sector by mentioning the failed attempt of the 
1970s where Import Substitution Industrialization in most African countries. At the production 
level, the structural intervention is intended to transform the kinds of products that Africa is 
producing the technologies being used in the process. Once again, it is stressed that, meeting the 
„critical needs‟ and attaining „food self-sufficiency‟ are the core points (par.42). On the other hand, in 
relation to the external world, the self-sustaining economic growth and development objective can 
be achieved only if Africa‟s unbalanced trend in exporting cheap primary products is changed. This 
trend makes African economies volatile as well as dependent in the external market. Therefore, the 
stated objective is to transform Africa from „trade dependence to trade viability‟ (par.43). This 
transformation is expected to boost the interdependence among African countries by focusing on 
enhancing inter-African trade by diversifying the export items with a primary objective of producing 
mainly to internal needs.  
 
The other vital element mentioned in the endeavor of achieving self-sustaining economic growth 
and development is technology. Technological internalization and financial autonomy are major 
areas of focus that can contribute to the long term objective of achieving an inward looking and 
structurally balanced development. By way of achieving these, it is expected that Africa‟s 
dependence to the external world which contributed immensely to the crisis in the 1980s (foreign 
exchange and aid dependence, reliance on foreign direct investment, debt accumulation) will be 
addressed permanently (par.44). 
 
One of the most important development objectives mentioned in the AAF-SAP is the issue of 
integration. The objective of integrating African economies is stated as a means of realizing „national 
and regional collective self-reliance‟ (par.45)., Regional integration is needed to pursue Africa‟s 
development objectives as well as a response to the global political economic realities. As it is stated 
in the document, „ … Africa sees self-reliance as both the goal and the means through which the 
region will eventually finds its true identity, full dignity and historic strength‟ (par.46).  As a strategy, 
the regional integration contributing to collective self-reliance is identified at three levels: i) the 
integration of physical, institutional and social infrastructures; ii) the integration of the production 
structures; and iii) the integration of the African markets. The integration process is clearly intended 
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towards building a strong interdependence among African countries in the political, economic and 
social spheres and capitalizing on the domains of convergence (par 47-48).  
 
II. The Alternative Framework 
The orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment programs intended to solve the socio-
economic crisis of the continent by focusing the use of competitive- domestic and external-market 
forces. This practice is deeply rooted in the mainstream classical economics assumption where 
market signals are taken as natural forces determining the demand and supply changes in the 
economy. In this assumption, the impact of socio-economic and political institutions in influencing 
the flow of the market is overlooked. The „African Alternative Framework‟ centers its argument by 
asserting that Africa‟s reality is totally different from the core assumption of the theoretical 
orientation. It argues that African economies have „weak production structures and imperfect 
markets‟ and the structural and institutional set up of the political economy has direct impact in the 
crisis of the 1980. Hence, the crisis need to be solved not by focusing on the internal and external 
financial balances rather by transforming the African political economy structures, institutions and 
systems in a way that fits to its internal dynamics and the external context (AAF-SAP 1989, p 16-26). 
 
As it is mentioned earlier, the intention of formulating the „alternative framework‟ is not to replace 
the SAPs framework with another general and binding framework. It is rather to set a 
comprehensive, accommodating and realistic agenda of development for the continent that can 
inform the practical engagement and policy orientation of respective countries in their context. 
Hence, the framework is dynamic. It is dynamic in a sense that, it is responsive to the changing 
situations across time, and adjustable and adaptable to the different realities of African political 
economies in different countries (par.76-80). With this core characteristic in mind, the „Alternative 
Framework‟ has „three sets of macro-entities’ which are operationalized in „three modules’.    
 
The three sets of macro-entities are: the operative forces, the available resources and the needs to be 
created for (ibid).  
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The operative forces: include socio-cultural, political, economic, environmental, scientific 
and technological issues that play a significant role in informing a development process 
through their pattern of interaction. 
The available resources: include human resources with quality and skill, natural resources 
(land, water and forests), domestic savings and external financial resources 
The needs to be created for: include the „vital‟ goods and services produced and the „ability 
to acquire them‟. This macro-entity squarely emphasized one of the central objectives of the 
alternative framework in attaining human centered adjustment and transformation. 
 
The dynamic character of the macro-entities both individually and collectively is explained across 
time and space. A change in the operative forces will necessarily have a spillover impact in the 
availability of resources, the manner in which they are being used to meet the needs of society. 
Moreover, the fact that society is also dynamic in its nature will also inform the change in the 
patterns of needs and the system in which these needs are produced, distributed and acquired by 
members of society. Hence, the specific point of time in which a specific country is found is a vital 
element to consider in analyzing the macro-entities identified here. 
 
The above mentioned operative forces, the available resources and the needs that they create when 
they interact and influence each other at different level, the pattern they say during their interaction 
and moreover the determining socio-political and economic context is explained in the following 
three modules, namely, (ibid)  
The Production module: explained in terms of the different sets of interactions and 
relational positions in the process of producing goods and services and generating factor 
income taking into consideration the degree of efficiency and productivity of allocated 
resources. 
The Distribution module: building on the production module, this module mainly focuses 
on the distribution of output and forces that determine the level and patterns of allocation of 
factor income. 
The Satisfaction module: constituted the operative forces that determine the production 
and the distribution modules and the interplay between them in determining the level of 
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income and income distribution to set the pattern of domestic needs satisfaction and 
external transactions (exports, imports, debt, aid and other resource flows)  
 
The alternative framework set these macro-entities and modules with an explicit statement that the 
framework is not intended to be a standard model to be followed or prescribed across countries 
irrespective of their unique context (par.80). Every country is expected to identify the existing 
operative forces, the pattern of their interaction in managing the available resources and the degree 
to of the production and distribution of goods and services meeting both the present and the future 
needs.  
 
While attempting to justify the different conceptualization of development within the „alternative 
framework‟, it is argued that the focus is not only on the structures of production and consumption 
but also in the pattern of wealth distribution. Furthermore, based on the stated objective of 
transforming the pattern of consumption, the „alternative framework‟ aspired to determine the 
nature of needs as well as the degree of satisfaction. By identifying the nature of interaction among 
the macro-entities and the modules, the production and consumption matter is expected to 
structurally transform to meet the material, social and cultural reality of the continent. In filling the 
identified gaps that SAPs have ignored in the social spheres, the „alternative framework‟ is intending 
to redress it through its human-centered development objective. This is achieved by focusing on 
employment generation to the majority, equitable income distribution and satisfying the „essential 
needs‟ of the people. 
 
The „alternative framework‟ loudly „reemphasized‟ its significant difference from the mainstream 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs. By taking the three most important modules as 
defining pillars of its framework, it criticized the ignorance of the orthodox program in addressing 
them. For instance, though the mainstream program has a focus in income generation, it overlooked 
the vital role of domestic demand in the process because of its unbalanced and outward looking 
production system, mainly primary export commodities. Furthermore, the mainstream program has 
totally ignored the mechanism of income redistribution which increased the social malaise during the 
crisis. This negative impact of the mainstream adjustment program is further aggravated by the 
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narrow objectives of prioritizing „internal and external balances‟ without giving the necessary 
attention to the „critical needs and services‟ that need to be met to enhance peoples‟ lives.  
 
The „alternative framework‟ has its own policy direction to materialize the macro-level proposal of 
structural transformation to the ground level.  It is by focusing on strengthening and diversifying the 
production system, improving incomes generated through the process of production and the 
maintaining  institutional and structural set ups for distribution and finally satisfying identified 
„critical needs‟. In the words of the lead architect of the framework, Adebayo Adedeji: 
…the internal logic is to bring about socio-economic diversification and sustaining development 
through fundamental changes in socio-economic structures base on the purposeful enhancement of 
infrastructures and the judicious combination and use of human and natural resources and 
technological know-how‟ (Adedeji 1990, p44) 
 
In the following section an attempt will be made to critically examine how differently the AAF-SAP 
problematized Africa‟s „developmental‟ challenge and conceptualized the issue of „development‟ 
differently.  
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Figure 3.2: The schematic representation of the AAF-SAP  
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4.3 How Different is the ‘Alternative’?  
The following section re-examines the presentation made so far about the AAF-SAP in 
understanding the political economic structure of the continent, in setting the development 
objectives and providing an alternative. By basing the literature review and the critical discourse 
studies as a tool, the assumptions of the text and the impact of the context in which it is produced 
will be analyzed. The main question at stake is how differently could the idea of „development‟ is 
conceptualized in the AAF-SAP? 
 
4.3.1 The Two Kinds of ‘Structural Adjustments’ & the Development 
Assumptions 
Obviously, the core assumption that drives the notion of „development‟ during the period of SAPs is 
heavily influenced by the ideological leanings and theoretical orientations of the 70s and 80s. The 
history of development theory passed through different stages of explanations since its inception in 
the post „WWII‟ period without significant change in its dogma that the „Western‟ system or socio-
economic and political organization is the route that should be followed by non-westerners. 
Structural functionalism and modernization theory lingered into the supposedly „new‟ theoretical 
explanations of „development‟ in the first four decades between their emergence and the inception 
of the AAF-SAP. Though John Toye argued that monoeconomics replaced structuralism in 
informing the policy directions and decisions of the SAPs period, both approaches emanate from 
the same knowledge framework that describes development in a linear evolution (Toye 1994, p.22-
24). Hence, there is no fundamental difference in their initial hypothesis and understanding of the 
concept of „development‟.   
 
This being the case, the SAPs problematized the structural and institutional challenges of Africa‟s 
economies from a vantage point that analyzed the developmental mission of societies in a „value 
free‟, „objective‟ and „universalistic‟ lens. Both monoeconomics and structuralism adhere to this 
orientation. It is based on this perspective that the recommendations to the „western‟ political 
economy context was easily replicated into the African reality without giving due consideration of 
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the peculiarities and wide range of differentiations. For instance, the mainstream „development‟ 
perspective asserts that the structural impediments that must be changed in the attempt of dealing 
with the economic crisis are market distortions, the increasing negative balance of payment, 
deteriorating terms of trade, depletion of external reserve, rising inflation and the like. Based on the 
principles of monoeconomics, all these macro-economic challenges have the same answer because 
markets are „markets‟ everywhere in the world.  
 
For the AAF-SAP, the structural impediments that needed adjustment in the African economies 
were deeply embedded into the „enabling and disenabling factors that are domestic and external, 
historical and contemporary‟ (par.1). Though the AAF principally agrees with the SAPs on the need 
of adjustments, the causes/the reasons for adjustment, the objectives of the adjustment and their 
execution in general differs significantly from the mainstream agenda. Indeed, it is possible to find 
the characterization of the African socio-economic and political context in terms of 
„underdevelopment‟ and „backwardness‟. This indicates the implicit framework of conceptualizing 
development across a continuum of „progress‟ towards a certain end. On the other hand, there is an 
explicit attempt of avoiding „Africa‟s imitative modernism‟ by transforming both the production and 
consumption patterns of African societies as well as by incorporating the values, norms and local 
orientations of people into the development endeavors.  
 
The principal reason for producing the „alternative framework‟ is to set the institutional and 
structural parameters within the African political economy. This is intended to facilitate the 
realization of „structural transformation and sustainable development‟ in the long-term without 
necessarily abandoning the short-term concerns of IMF and WB. The failure of the earlier 
stabilization and structural adjustment programs in achieving the stated objective of managing the 
economic crisis played a crucial role in setting the material condition for the inception of AAF-SAP. 
Moreover, the previous African initiatives manifested in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the 
Final Act of Lagos (1980) has also contributed immensely in informing both the domestic and 
external material conditions. These material conditions both historically embedded and currently 
existing include: the lingering systems of production structured during the colonial period, patterns 
of consumption, international and global relation, internal set up of institutions and the like have 
enlightened the problematization of Africa‟s political economic structural challenges. With regard to 
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the LPA, the ideals of realizing „self-reliant and self-sustained development‟ which ultimately 
requires a new framework of policy and practice can be also considered as one of the ideational 
ground for the emergence of the AAF-SAP.  
 
The stabilization and structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and their consequences in 
deteriorating African economies constitute the material condition for the emergence of AAF-SAP. 
Whereas the ideational drive constitutes the urge to frame Africa‟s needs and priorities and owning 
the destiny of the continent. These two causes are used to conceptualize Africa‟s development 
endeavor differently in the AAF-SAP. Indeed, both the material conditions and the ideational drives 
are intertwined, one being constitutive part of the other rather than factors contributing in their own 
separate spheres. Hence, the reaction towards these causes is also holistic in its nature.  For instance, 
one of the objectives of Africa‟s development mentioned in the document argues that the way in 
which development is conceptualized, designed and implemented need to emanate from the lived 
experiences and realities of the people. It argues that the socio-cultural, political, economic and 
environmental realities of the African societies need to be the starting points of the development 
process. By doing so, the „development‟ policy and practice can easily settle into peoples‟ lives rather 
than alienating them from the process. Achieving this objective requires a distinctive way of looking 
at the problems of Africa and formulating the remedies. And the AAF-SAP did this rightly so by 
interpreting the structural problems of the continent across a broad spectrum.  
 
The historical/material causes related to production and consumption which was unwisely outward 
oriented and the associated infrastructural and institutional set up of countries economies was clearly 
identified. This anecdote is further extended into the contemporary socio-economic life of people 
who are very keen in consuming what they do not produce and producing what they do not 
consume. Such kind of life style was embraced by the majority of mainly urban Africans as a modern 
lifestyle. People assumed that the value systems of the „developed countries‟ are more advanced than 
theirs. According to the AAF-SAP argument, this scenario makes African economies internally 
unsustainable and externally dependent. Hence, any intention of „development‟ has to take these 
facts into consideration and intend to transform not only structures of production and consumption 
but also people‟s orientation both towards themselves and „modernity‟.  
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In general, the structural adjustment that the „alternative framework‟ intended to address is deeply 
rooted into the historical and contemporary socio-cultural, political and economic system of the 
continent. And most importantly it was not an effort of adjusting into the existing global political 
economy and the mainstream ideas rather engaging into a long-term transformational process. 
Development is conceptualized as a process which is firmly located into the real African political 
economic context with a thorough understanding both internal and external challenges as well as 
historical and contemporary contexts. 
4.3.2 ‘Human Centered’ Approach to Development 
One of the stated objectives of the AAF-SAP clearly states that „[T]he ultimate goal of development 
in Africa is to ensure the overall well-being of the people through a sustained improvement in their 
living standard‟ (par.34). Moreover this, the realization of „food self-sufficiency‟ is also taken as the 
most important priority to be met under the „alternative framework‟. This clearly shows how 
differently the AAF-SAP could set priorities in the effort of achieving development. The attempt of 
demystifying the long-term and short-term development plan dichotomy is one of the entry points 
where the human centered approach weighs in. It is by going further from remedies focusing on „re-
establishing financial balances‟ to policy directions envisioning socio-economic transformation and 
sustainable development that the human element is embraced.  
 
Furthermore, the human centered element is incorporated as one of the three macro-entities that 
constituted the „alternative framework‟, through the „needs to be created for‟, likewise as one of the 
three modules, namely, „satisfaction of needs‟. The distribution module, the call for people‟s 
participation in the development process, the attempt of bringing vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups into the forefront of the development discourse all can be considered as the manifestations 
of the human centered approach of the AAF-SAP.  At this point it is wise to reflect on the 
conceptualization of the assumption of the „alternative framework‟ in meeting the „basic‟, „essential‟ 
needs of people.  
 
In reconciling the long-term objectives with the short term objectives, the „alternative framework‟ 
opted for the actions that are targeting the present levels of poverty and deprivation. Hence, 
addressing the immediate needs of people to survive with the fulfillment of the basic and minimum 
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requirements of life is taken as a valid option. In other words, the „Basic Needs‟ approach which has 
been promoted by the World Bank since its report in 1981, First Thing First: Meeting the Basic Human 
Needs in Developing Countries is appropriated by the „alternative framework‟. The „Basic Needs‟ 
approach become part of the development discourse after the notion of „trickle-down growth‟ 
promoted during the modernization theory era failed to fulfill the promises (Kapoor 2008, p.22). 
The basic needs approach has been challenged by various scholars from different angles. For 
instance, the attempt of determining the „basic needs‟ of people which is most of the time done by 
policy makers or donors is considered as disempowering and hierarchical. It is argued that the poor 
people are considered as passive recipients of the help from other actors, either the state or most of 
the time donors. Furthermore, the basic assumption that irrespective of any differences across time, 
space, cultural orientations, livelihoods and other peculiarities, the basic needs approach 
homogenizes people by narrowing down their needs to the „most basic ones‟. By doing so, it is 
authoritatively decided that food, shelter, water, health and education are the minimum „basic needs‟ 
that need to be fulfilled (ibid). The other string of criticism argues that, by giving too much attention 
to the basic needs that need to be fulfilled to the „poor people‟, most often, the issue of inequality at 
the broader, global and structural level which might be considered as the cause is neglected. 
Moreover, fulfilling the basic needs of people does not change their life fundamentally rather has a 
tendency to make them more dependent and powerless. 
 
Indeed, the criticisms forwarded against the basic needs approach are valid. And the manner in 
which the concept of basic needs is implicitly included into the „alternative framework‟ also needs a 
critical analysis by relating it to the broader assumptions and arguments of the document, as well as 
the criticisms forwarded. To start with, the „alternative framework‟ mentioned it very explicitly that 
avoiding the dichotomy between long-term and short-term development programs is one of its 
purpose. This is intended to be addressed by producing a comprehensive development program that 
does not take one at the expense of the other. Hence, it is based on this core assumption that the 
„basic needs‟ of the people living in abject poverty is targeted as part of the short-term component 
of the „alternative framework‟. The attainment of „food self-sufficiency‟ is one of the components of 
the basic needs that was also one of the main objectives of the LPA and continued to be in the 
AAF-SAP. 
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The other element of „needs‟ in the „alternative framework‟ is one of the three macro-entities 
mentioned in document. As being one of the core entities that constituted the „alternative 
framework‟, it is given broader and higher level of conceptualization than the usual definition. By 
locating it into the stated purpose and objective of the document, the concept of „needs‟ is 
expounded and linked with the wider political economy, production and consumption cycle as well 
as with one of the modules which ensures the consideration of domestic and external dynamics. It 
can be argued that, the needs based approach is taken to a higher level within the context of the 
„alternative framework‟. In the effort of putting people‟s well being at the center of its effort, the 
„alternative framework‟ attempts to transform the socio-political structures of African societies in a 
self-sustaining manner from within. The attempt of ensuring the backward and forward linkage of 
the production and consumption patterns, the effort of ensuring fair distribution of income and 
wealth after the production process and the focus given to vulnerable groups makes the „needs 
based‟ approach of the „alternative framework‟ different. It can also answer one of the criticisms 
towards the narrowness of the approach and how it can contribute to the long-term development 
objective if it is well anchored into a broader framework. Therefore, the human centered approach 
of the AAF-SAP can be considered as a mechanism of ensuring the comprehensiveness of the 
framework. This holistic intention encompasses filling the existing immediate gaps and contributing 
to the broader objective of socio-economic transformation. The established interlinked feature and 
the in-ward looking orientation is also a crucial point of strength. 
4.3.3 The Role of the State 
One of the essential assumptions towards the SAPs and its implementation is the nature of the 
inefficient and ineffective state. The hardcore neoliberal conception of society explicitly calls for the 
withdrawal of the state from the main scene and to assume a watchdog role in the free functioning 
market led economy.  
 
The role of the state was given serious attention in „alternative framework‟, from the diagnosis of the 
development problem to the objectives of African development and also to the recommendation of 
the new development framework. The AAF-SAP does not deny the fact that the existing structural 
and institutional set up of most African states is problematic and untrustworthy in realizing the 
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aspired socio-economic transformation. The capacity of the state in handling the economic crisis is 
contextualized within the broader challenges that it has been functioning.  
 
Historically, the state structure of most African countries is inherited from the colonial era with all 
its malfunctions and patrimonial structures. And proper functioning in the 1970s and 80s context of 
differently organized political economy with the same intuitional set up, production and 
consumption pattern as well as system of governance was implausible. Hence, any diagnosis in the 
dysfunctional features of the state has to take this into account. On the other hand, one of the 
remedies forwarded towards treating the inefficient and ineffective system of public administration 
in the state system was by introducing foreign experts and consultants with a financial support of the 
IMF and the WB. Such kind of short-sighted treatment of the symptoms of the state inefficiency 
continued to incapacitate the state at least for two reasons. One, it compromised the possibility of 
institutional capacity-building by focusing on the individual expertise of foreign professionals who 
were most of the times unable to grasp the root cause of most the problems they were dealing with. 
And secondly, it contributed to the indebtedness of the countries, a financial resource that the 
countries secured to execute a certain program totally outsourced to the foreign experts. Most of the 
time the conditionality of hiring foreign experts is a must to be fulfilled to access loans and aid from 
the IMF and the WB. The inherently weak state structure was further incapacitated through the 
SAPs programs. Hence, the attempt of the „alternative framework‟ was to defy both the internal and 
external challenges of the African state so as to make it a leading player in the self-reliant and self-
sustained socio-economic transformation. 
 
With this regard, it is aptly explained in the „alternative framework‟ that the main development goal 
is ensuring the improvement of people‟s well-being. And the problem of the continent is way 
beyond those that were taken as pre-texts to the execution of the SAPs. Hence, the state vs. market 
dichotomy is totally out of the equation in addressing the development need. It is rather adjusting 
the political economic structure of the continent from within in a way that functions appropriately 
and to the advantage of the continent in the external scene. In the domestic sphere, the state is 
expected to ensure the synchronization of the operative forces to make the ultimate use of the 
available resources and satisfy the needs of its citizens. The plan of ensuring the existence of a 
production system that first targets the domestic market satisfaction, with fair distribution of the 
61 
 
income and ensuring the satisfaction of both the basic needs and the delivery of other essential 
goods and services necessarily requires a strong state.  
 
When implicitly calling for the role of the state in the realization of the development aspirations, the 
„alternative framework‟ is not over emphasizing the capacity of the state and counting on its success 
unreservedly. It is rather an attempt of counter-balancing the discourse of the neoliberal orientation 
which romanticizes the role of the market as a fair allocator of resources and benefits. For instance, 
the AAF-SAP unequivocally denounces the provision of privatization scheme indiscriminately. It 
argues that the basis used to support the program, the „institutional superiority of private over public 
enterprises‟ (par.60[e]) and the readiness and capability of the domestic private sector to own state 
enterprises is very problematic. According to the AAF-SAP, such pretext is being used as a 
justification to liberalize the production and service sector to multinational companies which in turn 
has a horrendous impact in securing the welfare of the wider society. Trading off the social welfare 
and well-being of people for profitability and effectiveness is totally against the main goal of Africa‟s 
development objectives stated in the document. What the „alternative framework‟ trying is to strike 
the delicate balance between the private and the public sector without compromising the long term 
development objective i.e., to transform the socio-economic system of the continent in a self-
sustaining manner. And the state is considered as a vital actor in all this endeavors. 
Chapter Conclusions 
In relation to the stabilization and structural adjustment programs that have been carried out in 
African economies, the AAF-SAP took a different route starting from its inception. The initiative to 
make a thorough examination of SAPs and its impact, the role that African governments have 
assumed in producing the draft and the final versions of the document, and the political decision 
taken by the OAU to make it a continentally approved document makes the AAF-SAP different in 
its nature. The AAF-SAP‟s intention to win the decision making role about the political economy of 
African countries was achieved at least at the document level. At the political level, it tried to balance 
the lopsided negotiations between individual countries and sponsors/advocates of SAPs which 
somehow compromised the national sovereignty of African countries. In most cases, national 
governments had little power in influencing the design, implementation and monitoring of 
adjustment programs.  
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One the other hand, the AAF-SAP was also loud enough in addressing the social spheres of 
development practices. Indeed, there has been a call from the UN, mainly UNICEF, to have 
„structural adjustment with a human face‟. The AAF-SAP gave unconditional focus to the well-being 
of the majority, the poor and the vulnerable, both in its problem identification and developmental 
schemes.  
 
On the other hand, the central idea of counter balancing the externally imposed economic reform 
programs was also achieved by producing home-grown document. However, there might be some 
critical concerns against its claim of being a comprehensive framework which may have a similar 
danger of being „one size fits all‟. This danger of being another home-grown general framework that 
is blind to the different socio-economic, political and historical realities of African countries would 
be tasted if the AAF-SAP was fully implemented across the continent5.  However, what happened to 
the document particularly after its unanimous adoption by the OAU General Assembly in July 1989 
makes it difficult to critically examine its feature with this regard. This is because of the emergence 
of another authoritative document from the WB, nearly four months later (November, 1989),  about 
the political economy of African countries, namely „Sub Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth – 
a long-term perspective study‟. This WB document has become the dominant framework of reference in 
addressing the developmental questions of African countries.  
 
The WB showed a significant u-turn in its rhetoric in addressing the political economic crisis and the 
remedies forwarded to African countries. This changed discourse was echoed by the AAF-SAP a bit 
earlier. The principle of adhering to „human-centered development‟, „giving due emphasis to the 
unique structural context of African economies‟, and the focus for  „ long term plan of transforming 
African economies‟, were only few of the major points mentioned in the new WB document (WB, 
1989). Though it is difficult to argue that the WB has appropriated/recognized the ideas of AAF-
                                                          
5
 During the field work period, there was an attempt to conduct an extended discussion/interview with some officials at 
the UNECA. What is observed from the encounter with the officials is that the AAF-SAP document has become totally 
silenced immediately after its inauguration without being tasted on the ground. There is no any practical attempt both in 
the diplomatic core and the political elite to refer to the document. What is apparent at this point is to refer every 
political economic issue within the NEPAD framework (Field note, November 2010) 
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SAP or fall under the influence of the document, the change of the rhetoric is visible, at least at 
document level.  
 
The AAF-SAP was a strong reaction to the mainstream understanding of African development 
problems and prospects. The remedies provided by SAPs to the 1980s crisis were short-sighted and 
unsustainable. The only power the SAPs had was the sponsors behind the programs and the 
dominant ideology of the time that initiated the intervention. On the other hand, the AAF-SAP 
addressed the root causes of the crisis in African economies, the „structural‟ predicaments and 
institutional challenges. While SAPs were mainly obsessed with short-term solutions of the 
symptoms, the AAF-SAP went further in ensuring the long-term transformation of African 
economies. 
Moreover, the understanding of „development‟ in a context of economic growth and quantitative 
changes is also challenged. The obsession of providing a remedy from a single perspective for a 
variety of problems is counter-balanced by the attempt of broadly conceptualizing „development‟ in 
the AAF-SAP. Beyond the production and consumption pattern of societies, development is 
conceptualized as a process that is deeply rooted into the socio-cultural and historical features of 
societies. The AAF-SAP gave appropriate focus to the other features of societal life without 
necessarily disregarding the importance of economic growth for development. This attempt of 
locating development in the intricacies of social life makes the AAF-SAP more appealing than an 
attempt of fixing the economies at a superficial level. Generally speaking, one can certainly argue 
that AAF-SAP was a real alternative conceptualization of African development issues especially with 
regard to the IMF and WB programs of the 1980s. 
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Chapter Five  
Africa’s Development in the 21st Century –NEPAD’s Effort 
5.1 Introduction: Historical Review and Emergence 
This chapter presents a discussion of the other widely acclaimed document with regard to African 
politics and development, i.e. the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD). In 
presenting and critically examining this document, the historical, socio-economic and political 
context both at the continent and global level will be reviewed briefly. In doing so, the triggering 
factors for the production of the document, the actors involved in it as well as the steps taken in 
realizing the final version of the document will be discussed. 
5.1.1 The Continuation of the Crisis in the 1990s 
The economic crisis that aggravated the challenges for African states during the 1980s lingered into 
the 1990s with a wider impact. In the early years of the 1990s, the SAPs exacerbated the failure of 
the States to control the situation, either directly or indirectly. Moreover, the changing global order, 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the „Cold War‟, the emergence of the US as a prime 
hegemonic player in the global scene in the 90s, the increasing role of the IMF and WB in 
determining the fate of countries in the global south can be considered vital elements of the period. 
As to the internal African context, the impact of the global order was apparent, for instance the so- 
called wave of democracy that engulfed political systems of some countries, the end of Apartheid in 
South Africa, the conflict and civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, Burundi, Somalia, Angola, Congo, 
Liberia, or Sierra Leone. It resulted state collapse (Somalia) and genocide (Rwanda and Burundi):  
few cases marking the political and socio-economic crisis of the continent in the 90s (Ihonvbere, 
1996).  
Indeed, the situation in the 1990s needs to be considered in relation to the political economy of the 
continent in the previous decades. The socio-economic and political predicaments in the 1990s are 
the results of the crisis that afflicted the continent since the 1960s. Some consider the 1980 is a 
decade where Africa ended with more complex misery, challenges and deterioration than its status in 
the beginning of the decade (ibid). Having attempted to address the socio-economic crisis through 
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the SAPs, the AAF-SAP, the regional initiatives like the Abuja Treaty of 1991 (establishing the 
African Common Market by 2030) the early years of the decade were not promising enough to 
escape the label of being a „lost decade‟ (Cheru 2002, p. 3).  
The parameters of achieving development in the continent have been also changing along with the 
dynamics of the global context as well as the changing points of priorities among the main actors. 
With regard to the previous decade, development was mainly associated with ensuring the stable 
performance of the economic sector and managing the stabilization of macro-economy along certain 
indicators. And the SAPs were mainly focused in realizing these goals at least in their short-term 
plans. Moreover, with the inclusion of additional concerns into the discourse of development like 
globalization, ICT, security, human rights, good governance, democracy and the like, the challenges 
facing Africa and the mission of realizing „development‟ continued to be an uphill battle (Amoako, 
2000; Cheru, 2002; Ihonvbere, 1996). Indeed, these features become part and parcel of the discourse 
and practice of development based on the material conditions of most African states as well as 
through the imagination of what „development‟ has to constitute at the ideal level. Africa entered the 
decade (1990s) with unsolved, if not exacerbated, domestic challenges of incapacitated political 
systems, inappropriate policy environment, inefficient agricultural productivity, poor manufacturing 
base, inadequate skill base and an viable and realistic peace and security threat (Cheru, 2002: p.9-12). 
It is hardly possible to disentangle one from the other, rather each challenge contributing to the 
general bleak picture that has been painted about the continent both at that period and also in the 
previous years. Indeed, these seeming internal/domestic features did not operate in absolute manner 
rather in close collaboration with external challenges that, most of the time, exacerbated the fragile 
and deteriorating condition of the continent. As mentioned by Cheru, some of the key challenges 
that constituted the external challenges include: deteriorating terms of trade, uneven patterns in 
foreign direct investment flows, high level of debt and most importantly the absence of 
commanding power in decision making for the development strategies that the countries would like 
to adopt (loss of sovereignty) (ibid, p.13-19). 
It is within such kinds of context that, the continental organization, Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) began its journey of transforming itself into a different institutional set-up and structure, the 
African Union (AU). Likewise, the challenges that the member states were facing both collectively 
and individually also triggered the formulation of different development road maps and documents 
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by leaders of some countries. With this regard the efforts of the presidents of Algeria, Senegal, 
Nigeria and South Africa were paramount. Chronologically, the institutional transformation of the 
continental body preceded the emergence of the NEPAD document, but the material condition and 
the historical reality that gave rise to both initiatives remained the same. The transformation process 
of the OAU into the AU as well as the early steps of producing NEPAD as a continental 
development roadmap will be presented in the subsequent sections. 
5.1.2 The Transformation of the OAU to the AU 
After being established as a continental organ on May 25, 1963, the OAU continued to be the sole 
continental institution which ensured and transcended the presence of the continent from a 
geographical location into a political economic entity. The establishment of the OAU by itself can be 
interpreted along various lines depending on the perspective. Some argue that it was the 
embodiment of the Pan-Africanism movement which started in the 19th century and the 
manifestation of the will to act collectively in the post-independence era (Abraham, 2003; AU, 2007; 
Muruthi, 2007, van Walraven 1999). According to Muruthi, the OAU can be considered as one form 
of institutionalizing the ideals of Pan-Africanism in the 20th century. Indeed, the organization has 
incorporated one of the core principles of the Pan-Africanism movement, i.e. ending colonialism or 
ensuring „political freedom‟, when Nelson Mandela become the first democratically  elected 
president of South Africa after ending Apartheid (Muruthi 2007, p.2). The attempt of the continental 
institution to address the socio-economic and political problems of the member states through its 
various initiatives were not without obstacles. The internal challenges within member states as well 
as among member states of the OAU and the external challenges from the international political 
economy presented serious predicaments for the functioning of the institution. Various reasons can 
be mentioned with regard to these challenges. For instance, some argue that the fact that the Charter 
of the OAU stipulated in its provision to „defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of the member states‟ (OAU, 1963) compromised the superior position that it can 
assume to preside over issues across the continent (ibid). With this regard, the OAU was more of an 
inter-governmental institution with less impact in influencing the socio-economic and political 
situation of its member states.  
In spite of its institutional and principal limitations, the OAU has also attempted to realize one of 
the ideals of Pan-Africanism i.e. „collective self-reliance and self-sufficiency‟ (AU, 2007). The Lagos 
67 
 
Plan of Action of 1980 and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 to establish the African Economic Community 
by 2030 were intended to realize the socio-economic and political integration of the continent. But 
these efforts did not materialize to bring the intended result within the context of ineffective 
institutional set up within the continent as well as fragile and hostile external political economic 
environment. It is within such kind of context that the OAU embarked on the process of 
transforming itself into a new institutional set-up where the initial ideals of Pan Africanism would be 
pursued at a higher level. In principle, the AU was intended to build on the success of the OAU and 
address the challenges it failed to deal with. The AU is also considered as the third phase 
institutionalizing Pan-Africanism, the Pan-African Congress and the OAU being the previous ones 
(Muruthi 2007, p. 3). 
The core feature that constituted the AU was the new Constitutive Act which is the governing 
document of the institution. The Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) succinctly tried to address the 
recurrent challenges of the continent, to sustain and re-enforce the previous attempts of achieving 
certain goals, like establishing the African Economic Community and the Pan-African Parliament. It 
also envisioned incorporating the various newly emerging discourses in achieving socio-economic 
and political development, like issues of human rights, good governance, democracy, inclusion of 
civil society and the appropriate focus of peace and security issues (OAU, 2000). Both internal and 
external factors were seen as having an apparent role in informing the inclusion of these issues at 
this level as well as the attempt of ensuring the presence of appropriate institutional mechanism to 
realize them. For a Pan African perspective, the explicit assertion of the preamble of the 
Constitutive Act about the role of the Union in building partnership beyond the government level 
among „… all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order 
to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among … people‟ is an unequivocal recognition of the failure 
of the OAU, which operated mainly among states and government level structures (OAU, 2000, 
Houghton, 2008). Moreover, by adopting the principle of non-indifference in its Constitutive Act, 
the AU is given more power to intervene into a Member State pursuant to the decision of the 
General Assembly with the responsibility of protecting the rights of citizens from serious violations 
of human rights like genocide and war crimes (Art (4h)). Though there is an attempt of changing the 
widely held perception towards the continental institution which is under the control of dictators  or 
weak capacity to influence authoritarian regimes, in reality the newly born institution is still under 
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the control of the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments (Van Walraven 2004, p.199) This 
new discourse of creating a continental citizenship might be another success in the eyes of the early 
Pan-Africanists whose ideas were drowned out by African Nationalism (Sturman, 2007). The 
Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted in Togo, Lome at the 36th Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the OAU on July 11, 2000 and the AU was 
formally established in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. 
The transformation of the OAU into the AU needs to be understood in the context of the 
increasing challenges that the previous institution had been facing in the areas of socio-economic 
and political development, in addition to the embodiment of Pan-African ideology and sentiment. It 
has become apparent that the old institutional set-up and some of the founding principles of the 
OAU were not going hand in hand with the dynamism of both the internal and external political 
economy. Moreover, the emergence of new challenges ideally required a new set of minds and 
strategies. With this regard, the discourse of globalization and marginalization of the continent, 
which has been echoed by various prominent figures and heads of states, played a significant role to 
re-enforce the institutional set up of the continent so as to fit into the global political economy 
context. The individual and collective effort of some presidents can be also understood as part of 
this wider attempt which finally produced NEPAD as a continental development program. 
5.1.3 Initial Steps towards NEPAD 
The final document of NEPAD, launched on October 23rd, 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria was the result of 
previous attempts by different African leaders in producing a comprehensive development 
framework for Africa. The major initiatives which gave rise to the final document are the Millennium 
Partnership for the African Recovery Program  (henceforth, MAP) which was spearheaded by the then 
President Tambo Mbeki of South Africa, and the Omega Plan produced by President Abdoulaye 
Wade of Senegal. The two documents have traveled their own journey before being combined to 
form the New African Initiative (NAI) which later on changed into the New Partnership for Africa‟s 
Development (NEPAD).  Compared to the Omega Plan, the MAP have gone further steps in 
popularizing its objectives and planned activities under the auspices of Mbeki in 2001. These efforts 
of popularizing the document under the motto of „African Renaissance‟ were mainly targeting the 
„development partners‟ in the West. After declaring his conviction that the 21st century should 
become „Africa‟s century‟ during his presidential speech, Mbeki spend a lot of effort in promoting 
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his ideas through the MAP document. According to his own account, even before the document 
was produced a series of consultations have been made with „… the political leadership of the 
developed world – the North‟ (Mbeki, 2001, as quoted on Nabudere, 2002). These consultations 
involve meetings with Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Bill Clinton, Governor George W. Bush, 
addressing meeting of Nordic Prime Ministers, addressing the meeting of the European Council, the 
G-7 meeting in Tokyo (with President Obasanjo and Bouteflika), with Japanese Prime Minister, 
President of the World Bank, Managing Director of the IMF, addressing the UN Millennium 
Summit, President Putin and UN General Secretary Kofi Annan (ibid). These consultations and 
meetings were conducted in the year 2000, mainly in the building up process of MAP and before the 
MAP document was initially presented at the World Economic Forum on January 2001. 
Mbeki argued that the imperatives of conducting these series of consultations with „the partners‟ in 
the global North was to express the firm commitment in addressing the developmental challenges of 
Africa and winning their will to be partners. In his address the World Economic Forum in January 
2001, Mbeki mentioned that the MAP would be open to incorporate other African countries so long 
as „… (they) are prepared and ready to commit (themselves) to the underlying principles guiding the 
initiative‟ (Mbeki, 2001, as quoted on Nabudere, 2002; Adesina, 2006). The Lome Summit in July 
2000 delegated the Presidents of Nigeria, Algeria and South Africa to produce a document to be 
circulated to heads of States. But the efforts of Mbeki to popularize the ideals of MAP to the 
northern counterparts was already in progress, and later on President Obasanjo and Bouteflika 
joined him to the G-7 meeting in Tokyo, Japan. Hence, Mbeki was successful enough in bringing 
other leaders to join his effort and winning the support of the OAU in his endeavor.  
The core argument of MAP with regard to addressing the development needs of the continent was 
by integrating Africa into the global political economy. Building upon the discourses of Africa‟s 
marginalization and globalization, Mbeki argued that unless there is a sound continental 
development program in partnership with the global North, the social exclusion and continued 
marginalization of the continent might pose a serious challenge and threat to the global order. 
Hence, MAP insisted that African countries facing the challenge of exclusion and marginalization 
needed to do their homework to win their meaningful place and multinational institutions and donor 
countries had to also provide the necessary support. And MAP was „a pledge by African leaders …‟ 
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(MAP, 2001) to engage in a full-scale commitment of addressing the social, economic and political 
challenges of Africa both individually and collectively.   
On the other hand, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade presented, in May 2001, another 
document under the theme the Omega Plan to the platform focusing on issues of infrastructure, 
agriculture, health and education (Adesina 2006, p. 35; Nabudere 2002, p. 54). The Omega Plan 
prioritized investment on physical infrastructure and human capital development to achieve 
sustained economic growth and development. Indeed, both the Omega Plan and MAP had the same 
objective of creating an „African-driven‟ development framework through which the challenges of 
the continent were to be addressed. Both documents called for the leading role to be played by 
Africa‟s political economic elite and aspired putting the continent on the path of economic growth 
and sustainable development (Omega Plan, 2001, Map, 2001).  Hence, building on their point of 
convergence, the Lusaka Summit of OAU in July 2001 decided to merge the two documents and 
produced the New African Initiative, which later became the NEPAD document.   
5.2 The New conceptualization of Africa’s Development - NEPAD 
The NEPAD document officially came into existence in October, 2001 at the meeting of the Heads 
of States Implementation Committee (HSIC) in Abuja, Nigeria. The HSIC was a new structure 
introduced as part of the NEPAD initiative to carry out a high level administration of the newly 
born development roadmap. In this section, an attempt will be made to introduce the basic features 
of NEPAD and its conceptualization of „development‟ in the African context. As mentioned in the 
earlier chapters, the main purpose here is to critically examine how „development‟ was 
conceptualized and problematized. Hence, there will be a limited effort in going in-depth to examine 
the implementation strategy and the execution of programs of NEPAD. 
The final version of the NEPAD document has seven core sections, each with a specific focus and 
purpose. The first section is an introduction which attempts to lay the foundations and the rationale 
of the basic arguments of the document. In the second section, an attempt is made to contextualize 
the feature of Africa in the world by contrasting the observed facts of poverty and prosperity in the 
world. In doing so, the historical roots contributing to Africa‟s current situation and the impact of 
the present global system is also presented. The third and fourth sections of the document have 
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uniquely addressed the political economic elites and the peoples of Africa. The sections include a 
pledge from the political leadership and the political will that they have, followed by a section which 
calls up on the peoples of Africa and their role in achieving the objectives of NEPAD. A significant 
portion of the document is dedicated to outline the program of action under the theme „The 
Strategy for Achieving Sustainable Development in the 21st Century‟. This section describes the core 
activities of NEPAD by stating the conditions and necessary scenarios for sustainable development, 
sectoral priorities and mobilizing resources as part of its component. The sixth section focused on 
one of the core features of NEPAD, i.e. the partnership, a „new global partnership with 
industrialized countries and multinational organizations‟. Finally, the last section states the 
implementation of projects for the realization of NEPAD‟s objectives (NEPAD, 2001).  
5.2.1 Setting the Development Agenda in NEPAD’s Perspective 
I) Africa and the Global Political Economy 
NEPAD has attempted to present the socio-economic, political and environmental challenges that 
Africa has been facing in its own perspective. In the document, the articulation of Africa‟s quest for 
development is attached with the features of the global political economic phenomena. The situation 
in which Africa is found (during the formulation of the document) is presented in contrast with the 
then situation in the „developed world‟. By juxtaposing the „poverty and backwardness of Africa‟ 
with the „prosperity of the developed world‟, NEPAD builds its premise to argue that Africa is 
marginalized from the globalization process (NEPAD 2001, par.2). NEPAD asserts that allowing 
the continuation of such marginalization and „social exclusion‟ has a dire effect on the stability and 
security of the global system (ibid).   
The underlying arguments of NEPAD with respect to the interaction of Africa with the global 
political economy can be generally categorized into two themes: historical legacies and present 
challenges. Indeed, the two insights are not mutually exclusive; rather the challenges that constitute 
the present are cumulative effects and continuing legacies of the historical past. What is being 
presented in the historical legacies dates back to the colonial period, which „subverted … traditional 
structures, institutions and values or made them subservient to the economic and political needs of 
the imperial power‟ (par. 21). The impact of the colonial period political economic system lingered 
to the „post-independence‟ period having an impact for the failure of building a strong capitalist class 
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and inadequate professional skill contributing to the insufficient wealth accumulation in the entire 
economic system. Moreover, the newly „independent‟ states were characterized by their weak 
capacities, inefficient and ineffective economic system, unresponsive political governance and 
patronage. The internally unfavorable situation further aggravated through the Cold War period 
which further deteriorated „… the development of accountable governments across the continent‟ 
(par.22).  
Moreover, the historical legacies that NEPAD attempts to counter constitute the initial interaction 
that Africa has with „institutions of the international community‟. It argues that Africa joined this 
platform from a subordinate position, and its development endeavor is characterized through the 
channeling of aid or credit from these institutions. This feature, „the credit and aid binomial‟, played 
a negative role against the development objectives of the continent. The credit element created the 
debt burden in many African economies whereas the aid element is also proven untrustworthy by its 
continuous reduction from the target set in the 1970s (par.3). Hence, what NEPAD aspires to 
achieve is to restructure this unbalance with the „international community‟.  
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing 
the relationship that underpins it Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of 
dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions (par.5)  
According to NEPAD, the developmental challenges that Africa is facing are a function of the 
colonial period legacies, the ineffective features of the entire socio-economic and political structure 
in the post-independence African countries, the influence of the Cold War period, and also the 
impact of the failed policies and strategies that Africa was forced to adopt during the SAPs period. 
The combination of these factors constituted the vicious circle of crisis that the continent is trapped 
in. The inefficient state structure which was further compromised during the structural adjustment 
period, the continuing economic decline associated with increasing debt and unsuccessful aid trap 
characterized the deeply rooted problems of Africa‟s development quagmire. And this 
characterization is further explained through the other dominant discourses in the NEPAD 
document i.e. marginalization and globalization. 
The other basic point of departure in problematizing the development challenge of Africa in 
NEPAD‟s perspective is to locate the present challenges based on the historical legacies. The 
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present challenges of development presented by NEPAD are tightly associated with the process of 
globalization and explained through the discourse of marginalization. By laying the foundation for 
such an assertion in the historical legacies, Africa is presented as a passive actor in the globalization 
process with a „…limited integration into the global economy‟ (par.16). According to NEPAD 
globalization is: 
… a product of scientific and technological advances, many of which have been market-driven. Yet, 
governments-particularly those in the developed world-have, in partnership with the private sector, 
played an important role in shaping its form, content and course (par.39). 
Globalization is further understood as a process that has both negative and positive aspects. The 
positive aspects are highlighted through the increasing opportunities for acquiring knowledge and 
skills, the intermediary role that ICT is playing in enhancing economic activities, improving access to 
goods and services and in general contributing to the creation and expansion of wealth. On the 
other hand, the negative aspects of globalization are explained through the asymmetrical power 
relation among the global players. NEPAD argues that „… globalization has increased the ability of 
the strong to advance their interest to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, 
finance and technology‟ (par.33). Such unfavorable conditions in the global context continued to 
disregard the interest of „developing countries‟ and their capacity to control their own course of 
development. And so far, according to NEPAD, there has not been any effort to compensate the 
loss that these passive global players have suffered. The global political economy being a highly 
competitive, unfair and unjust system of attaining benefits, it is argued that developing countries are 
always in a disadvantageous position. African countries, most of them, are playing a minimal role in 
determining the course of the globalization process. Their weak role is characterized by losing their 
ground to benefit from what they have through unfavorable trade balances, being weak states in 
managing their internal political economy, and unable to attract private investment and foreign 
direct investment. These features combined to sustain the self-perpetuating cycle of marginalization 
in the globalization process (par.34-35). 
Though the role of globalization in integrating the world political economic system is recognized by 
NEPAD, in Africa‟s context „…greater integration has also led to the further marginalization…‟ 
(par.33). Hence, an „…effectively managed integration…‟ (par.28) is necessary to reap the benefits of 
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the current trend of globalization. NEPAD is optimistic that the present global order offers the ideal 
opportunity to reverse the historically unfavorable situations that hindered Africa‟s development. It 
is argued that resources (capital, technology and human resource) are readily available that can help 
to realize the aspirations of NEPAD and end marginalization of the continent from the system. 
„Imaginative leadership‟, which would realize the ultimate use of the available resources and the 
presented historical opportunity is needed, according to NEPAD.  
With regard to the dominant discourse of poverty reduction of that time, the globalization process is 
further understood as a phenomenon that inherently lacks any kind of element to achieve the 
poverty reduction agenda. Hence, what NEPAD is calling for is that actors within the global 
political economy to ensure the „genuine integration of all nations‟ (par.41) as well as the creation of 
fair and just system within which the benefits and opportunities of globalization are equally shared 
through partnership with the international community (ibid). NEPAD presented the challenges and 
prospects of African development within a context which has been unfavorable for Africa since the 
colonial period and exacerbated by the current globalization process and the marginalization of the 
continent. It also recognizes the presence of genuine opportunities to redress the situation and also 
the commitment from African leaders to contribute to that.  
II) Actors of Development 
According to NEPAD, „…development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance.‟ And it 
argues that „… Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the 
architects of their own sustained upliftment‟ (par.27). Through such kinds of strong assertions 
NEPAD claims to give a credible way of realizing development through the active role of „the 
people‟. It claims that the will and the determination of „Africans‟ to change the undesirable situation 
is considerably high, by arguing that,   
Across the continent, Africans declare that we will no longer allow ourselves to be conditioned by 
circumstances. We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement 
our efforts. There are already signs of progress and hope. Democratic regimes that are committed to 
the protection of human rights, people-centered development and market-oriented economies are on 
the increase. African peoples have begun to demonstrate their refusal to accept poor economic and 
political leadership. These developments are, however, uneven and inadequate and need to be further 
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expedited. [NEPAD] is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the 
international community, especially the highly industrialized countries, to overcome the development 
chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations (par.7-8). 
In the attempt of crafting a new development path for Africa, at least three development actors are 
identified in the NEPAD program. The initial and arguably leading actors are the states and by 
implication African leaders. There is a specific section in the final document dedicated to the „The 
New Political Will of African Leaders‟. Given the fact that NEPAD is a combination of the 
initiatives of Mbeki and Wade, it is expected that it will continue to be a state-led initiative 
throughout its implementation. What NEPAD attempts to paint is a new image clearly showing that 
the political will of African leaders is already in place and they are committed to the realization of 
the program‟s objectives. NEPAD recognizes the various continent-wide development programs in 
the past that were initiated both internally and externally and which were not successful enough in 
answering the ownership and leadership role of Africans. It puts itself in a unique position where 
ownership, leadership and commitment of African leaders and their political will is already in place. 
NEPAD takes the increasing trends of establishing democratic systems across the continent and the 
incorporation of new concepts of governance and development into the mainstream discourse, like 
the right to development, eradication of poverty, accountability, human rights and popular 
participation as a manifestation of the political will of African leaders (par.42-44). 
It is frequently asserted that NEPAD is all about winning the African ownership and management 
and setting the agenda of Africa‟s renewal by implementing development programs based on 
regional and national priorities. In doing so, the NEPAD initiative intends to facilitate the creation 
of a functional partnership with the industrialized world and multinational institutions (par.47-48). 
The stated responsibilities of African leaders manifesting their political will are described in four 
broad themes (par.49): 
Governance, peace and security: conflict prevention, mechanisms of restoring and maintaining 
peace, promoting democracy and human rights, accountability, transparency and participatory 
governance 
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Managing the economy: macroeconomic stability, appropriate fiscal, monetary policies and 
institutional frameworks, regulating financial markets, auditing private companies and the public 
sector 
Social Services: revitalizing the provision of education, technical training and health with special 
focus on HIV/AIDS and malaria, women empowerment (social, economic and political) 
Strengthening State capacity: the capacity legal enforcement and maintaining law and order 
Production sector: infrastructure development, agricultural diversification through agro-industries 
targeting both internal and external markets 
It is argued that the unprecedented political will from African leaders to play a leading role in 
winning the developmental path of continent into their hands is the unique feature of the program. 
And combining this effort with the commitment of African people and the will of the international 
community will certainly bring the desired state development for the continent.  
NEPAD also considered the peoples of Africa as major actors for the development endeavor it is 
embarking on. The „Appeal to the Peoples of Africa‟ is a call in recognition of the fundamental role 
that African people can play in the realization of the NEPAD program. The call for the mobilization 
of the African people across the continent, „in all their diversity‟, is tuned by the discourses that 
NEPAD is echoing. The role of the peoples of Africa is intended to help „…the rapid integration (of 
Africa) into the world economy‟, „… to put an end to further marginalization of the continent … 
…bridging the gap with the developed countries‟ and to „…build sound and resilient economies, and 
democratic societies‟ (par. 52-58). By doing so, NEPAD defined the possible role of the peoples of 
Africa and integrated it into is development narrative by appealing to the people, an appeal from the 
leaders to the people. 
The other significant actor that is identified by NEPAD throughout its development discourse is the 
„international community‟, constituted by the industrialized countries/the developed world and the 
multinational institutions. Indeed, the entire notion of NEPAD is building „a new framework of 
interaction‟ with these actors so as to implement the development program. In line with the 
arguments of globalization and the increasing marginalization of the continent, NEPAD admits that 
the „international community‟ has a significant role in helping Africa to realize its development 
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objectives. It seems that, NEPAD has taken the existing trend of competitive globalization and 
liberalization processes for granted and the only way out is to ensure „…effectively managed 
integration‟ of the continent into the process so as to answer the development questions (par.28, 48, 
50, 52).  Hence, for NEPAD addressing the socio-economic and political challenges of the 
continent is impossible without the intended balanced partnership and interaction with the 
„international community‟ 
III) Stated Development Objectives of NEPAD 
NEPAD claims that it has a unique approach from previous initiatives to deal with the development 
challenges of the continent, even though the challenges being faced are almost the same. And this 
distinctive approach has a long-term vision of „an African-owned and African-led development 
program‟. As argued in its program of action, this long-term development endeavor intends to 
„…place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and 
development and thus halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process‟ (par. 59-62). 
NEPAD identified the core problem so far contributing to the bleak picture of Africa as the inability 
to build a mechanism of sustaining growth at all required levels which can significantly contribute to 
poverty reduction and sustainable development (par.64). Hence, ensuring the presence of a program 
that deals with this identified key development challenges is what NEPAD is aspiring to do. 
NEPAD stated its objectives in different forms. One of these objectives is , „…to provide an 
impetus to Africa‟s development by bridging existing gaps in priority sector to enable the continent 
catch up with developed parts of the world‟ (par.65). On the other hand, in its conclusion part, the 
objective of NEPAD is described as an action „… to consolidate democracy and sound economic 
management in the continent‟ (par.204). Furthermore, the long-term development objective is stated 
in two points: 
 To eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries, both individually and 
collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the 
marginalization of Africa in the globalization process 
 To promote the role of women in all activities 
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The long-term objective is accompanied by two goals: to achieve and sustain a GDP growth rate of 
7% per year for the next 15 years and to ensure the continent achieves all the International 
Development Goals by 2015 (which were later translated into MDGs). The stated long-term 
development objectives and achieving the goals is expected to have the following outcomes: 
 Economic growth and development and increased employment, 
 Reduction in poverty and inequality, 
 Diversification of productive activities, enhanced international competitiveness and 
increased exports, 
 Increased African integration. 
The expected outcomes are intended to be achieved through extended project activities identified as 
priority areas by the program. In this regard, the conditions for sustainable development are 
identified and categorized in three broad sections: a peace and security initiative, a democracy and 
political governance initiative, and an economic and corporate governance initiative. These 
conditions are expected to facilitate the execution of the prioritized project activities in infrastructure 
development, human resource development, ICT, social service provisions, and other socio-
economic and political sectors (NEPAD 2001, p.16-21). 
5.3 Why NEPAD is ‘New’, why not? 
After laying the foundation with regard to the historical emergence and the development 
assumptions of NEPAD, this section will focus on questioning the claims that NEPAD is putting 
forward. The ideas that govern the entire notion of the NEPAD initiative, it‟s „newness‟, the 
„different approach‟ that it is adopting in addressing the development quagmire of the continent will 
be examined thoroughly.  
5.3.1 Conceptualizing Africa’s Development 
Development is not limited to technical and managerial aspects. It is highly influenced by the initial 
ideas that inform the perception of the actor(s) in understanding the context and prioritizing the 
situation at hand. With this regard, the position of the actor(s), the nature of interaction with other 
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actors, and the context in which the interaction is taking place plays a paramount role in 
understanding the development equation. NEPAD came into existence in a context dominated by 
certain ideas that fundamentally shaped the entire development endeavor in a hegemonic mode. 
Neoliberal perspectives of development informed by the post Washington Consensus have been 
influencing the theory, ideology and practice of development in the global political economy. Hence, 
the emergence of NEPAD and its attempt to adopt a „different approach‟ to Africa‟s development 
need to be seen in this broad framework. 
It is quite obvious that NEPAD simply adopts the mainstream notion of development: a continuum 
where „undeveloped/underdeveloped/backward‟ societies/countries are following the footsteps of 
„developed/industrialized/advanced‟ societies/countries in a unidirectional progression. In the 
statements like: „[T]he poverty and backwardness of Africa stand in stark contrast to the prosperity 
of the developed world‟ (par.2), and „[T]he objective of NEPAD is to provide an impetus to Africa‟s 
development by bridging the existing gaps in priority sectors to enable the continent catch up with 
developed parts of the world‟ (par.65), one can easily grasp the ideas informing what development 
constitutes in NEPAD‟s perspective.  
According to Sally Mathews (2004, p. 498), NEPAD‟s conceptualization of development is a 
combination of modernization theory and the dependency school thinking. In describing the 
situation of Africa in terms of „backwardness‟ and the objective of NEPAD to „catch up with the 
developed world‟ or „bridging the gap‟ and „overcoming chasm‟: the mantra of modernization theory 
is embraced as the only framework of analysis. On the other hand, the characterization of the 
African context in terms of „underdevelopment‟ is a classic feature of the dependency school 
argument which positions the underdevelopment of the some societies in a dialectical contrast of 
development of the other (Mathews 2004).  In principle, dependency theory was presented as 
criticism to modernization theory. But it is argued in many instances that the critique of the 
“Dependentistas” was merely within the same framework of modernization theory, which assumes 
the presence of universally acceptable socio-economic and political conditions where everyone 
should head to (Kapoor 2008, p.8-9; Mathews 2004, p. 498-499). The normative understanding of 
development is a common feature for both theories; and their difference is mainly in the process of 
achieving this goal. According to Mathews, the architects of NEPAD have wisely used the 
combination of the two perspectives in conceptualizing the development challenges of Africa.  
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Adhering to the mainstream understanding of development is also manifested in the priority issues 
that NEPAD is dwelling on, the problems that it prioritizes and also the practices of achieving 
development. The reading of the African political economy both in the colonial period and in the 
post-independence era used to justify the appropriation of the dominant developmental discourse 
and ideology of the time. The same political-economic facts about Africa were used to introduce an 
„alternative framework‟ i.e. AAF-SAP, whereas NEPAD implicitly embraced the neo-liberal 
orientation to give remedies for Africa‟s challenges. The neo-liberal inclination is widely visible in 
the NEPAD document in its succinct stress on “„sound macro-economic policies‟, institutional and 
legal reform, and greater openness of Africa to the process of globalization” (Adesina 2006, p.34). 
The adoption of the mainstream discourses of the late 90s and early years of the new millennium, 
like poverty reduction, good-governance, human rights and democracy into the document is 
apparent given the fact that the main author, Mbeki,  was seriously engaged in presenting and 
„consulting‟ the document with Northern counterparts. Furthermore, NEPAD seems to take the 
current state of the global political economy for granted or as inevitable, and considered that the 
only option for Africa is to engage with it „wisely‟. The statement „ [T]he African Renaissance project 
… depends on the building of a strong and competitive economy as the world moves towards 
greater liberalization and competition‟ (par.50), explicitly shows NEPAD‟s position with regard to 
taking liberalization and market-oriented political economy as an unavoidable reality. On the other 
hand, some argue that the arguments of NEPAD are deeply rooted into the discourse of the 
„partners‟, and the call for greater integration into the globalization process is part of the diplomatic 
mission of winning their heart for the implementation of NEPAD (Taylor 2006, p.66).  
Hence, if we go deep into the arguments of NEPAD and its conceptualization of „development‟, 
what we find is merely a carbon-copy of what has been echoed by different actors for more than 
half a century. Moreover, what we find is an African version of appropriating the neo-liberal 
oriented „development‟ endeavor, where economic growth, liberalization, free-trade are considered 
as the mechanisms for the poverty reduction. This conceptualization of „development‟ deeply rooted 
into the mainstream perspective is manifested into the entire sets of arguments that are provided in 
the document, the marginalization discourse, the partnership and the like. 
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5.3.2 Power relations in Producing and Implementing NEPAD 
The emergence of NEPAD in late 1990s can be also seen from the vantage point of the position of 
actors that have played major role in its formulation as well as their agency in realizing their ideas. 
The historical context with its own role to facilitate the presence of certain ideas presiding over 
others is also a vital element with this regard. The emergence of Thabo Mbeki and Olusegun 
Obasanjo as presidents of their respective countries (South Africa and Nigeria, respectively) had a 
significant impact in changing both the political discourse as well as the institutional set up of the 
continent (Teiku, 2004). Further analysis of the ideas informing their foreign policies, the motives 
and interests clearly show, according to Teiku, the dominant political discourse of liberalism in the 
political economy of their respective countries. Hence, their action in the continental sphere is 
considered as an extension of their actions in their countries (ibid: p. 253-260). Mbeki was 
committed to boost South Africa‟s economy by increasing the employment opportunities and 
stimulating economic growth and to put South Africa at the front line in attracting FDI. His mission 
of realizing „Africa‟s renaissance‟ was widely preached and used as an initial document to further 
produce NEPAD (Adesina, 2006; Taylor, 2006). On the other hand, Obasanjo was very keen on the 
issues of stability, security, co-operation and thereby development across the continent which were 
real challenges for most African countries in the 1990s. With this regard, the issues of stability and 
security were addressed mainly by incorporating the liberal principles of good governance, the rule 
of law, human rights and citizens‟ participation (Teiku, 2004; p.255-260).  
NEPAD soon became the economic development program of the African Union after its official 
launching in October, 2001. The incorporation of NEPAD into the continental structure cannot be 
separated from the role that the main initiators of the document have within the continental political 
economy power structure. Though there is a normative principle that every member state has equal 
sovereign status, there is an implicit hierarchy. Particularly the so called the „big five‟ [Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Nigeria and South Africa] countries that are contributing huge amount of financial support to 
the AU, compared to other member states, have more diplomatic power in channeling their ideas 
easily. The NEPAD initiative being led by Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa, it was an 
easy mission to incorporate it into the continental structure. To this end, another organ under the 
Assembly of the African Union is created constituted by Heads of States and Governments which 
convenes its secretariat in parallel with the AU General Assembly. The diplomatic win within the 
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continental power structure to put NEPAD as the guiding framework of reference is consolidated 
without any significant challenge. 
The external relations in which the lead initiators of NEPAD have gained positive response have 
succeeded by appropriating the dominant discourse of the time into the NEPAD. Rather than 
appealing for special treatment of African countries within the global political economy and a call 
for anti-imperialism, the authors of NEPAD favored the ideas of „liberalization, free trade and 
globalization‟ as the means of realizing their objectives (Taylor 2006, p.66-68). Some people further 
argue that, this is the manifestation of the domination of a supranational class with the „emerging 
transnational élite‟ playing its implicit role in determining policy orientations to its favor. This global 
élite functions globally and includes globalizing state bureaucrats, transnational executives, capitalist-
inspired (liberal) politicians and professionals, consumerist élites, like minded think-tanks and the 
academia. Its global and transnational feature is marked with the role that both state and non-state 
actors from the global south are playing. And NEPAD is regarded as an embodiment of this 
phenomenon in Africa with the role of the political and economic élites the initiated and 
implemented it. Embracing the ideals of globalization, liberalization, free-trade, minimal state and 
active role of the private sector for poverty reduction and development in Africa is taken as a 
justification for the critique (ibid).  
5.3.3 Paradoxes and Controversies  
The very first opening statement of NEPAD states that it is „…a pledge from African leaders…‟ 
(par.1). This pledge is to end the miseries of Africa, to eliminate poverty, underdevelopment and 
„exclusion from the globalizing world‟. It is also considered as an effort to put the fate and destiny of 
the continent in the hands of Africans and to end the trends and circumstances that have been 
detrimental to the case of Africa (par.7).  The core element that makes NEPAD different from 
earlier attempts of realizing development in Africa is its call for a „new relationship of partnership‟ 
between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialized countries. It 
aspires to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal relations‟ 
(par.8). Moreover, NEPAD also considers itself as „a new framework of interaction‟ (par.48), and „an 
African-owned and African-led development program‟ (par.60). 
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The entire notion of being „new’ and ‘African-owned/led’ can be questioned with its own explicit 
assertion that the „international community‟ is the one upon which NEPAD is relying. NEPAD is 
equally calling for the „recognition of global interdependence … that recognizes partnership among 
all peoples‟ (par.41). Moreover, it is based on the „hope‟ that the so-called international community is 
willing to create a fair and just global order that will help Africa to have a meaningful role (ibid). 
Historically speaking, during the last few decades, the African political economy has been under the 
watchful eyes of the former colonial masters and the Bretton Woods Institutions during and after 
the colonial period, respectively. The spheres of influence include the structures and systems of 
production and consumption, and the level of integration with the global economy and body politic. 
NEPAD admits that the interaction and relationship with the global political economy was 
asymmetrical, exclusionary and to the disadvantage of Africa. And yet, with the same tone, it is 
calling for the will of the leading global political economy players for a new set of modalities 
determining the relationship between Africa to be fair and just. The uncompromising commitment 
of the global political economic system to pursue capital accumulation, competitiveness and profit 
making endeavor is „expected’ to be willing to accommodate the development interests of Africa. But 
there is no explanation given in NEPAD why „ …the competition that has marked the evolution of 
global capitalism would suddenly not set structural limits for Africa‟s development, and why forces 
of global capital would be willing, given their search for expansion and profits, to facilitate the 
continent‟s development‟ (Sahle 2008, p.144). Maintaining a competitive environment and 
disregarding those that are unfit to exist, focusing on extending capital so as to cope within the 
fierce competitive environment is the mantra of the capitalist mode of production. And NEPAD is 
trying to go against this basic principle to establish a partnership with the so-called „international 
community‟. Given the unlikely nature of NEPAD‟s expectation, it makes it more unrealistic to 
convey a message claiming that the process is „African led/owned‟ and „new‟. It is a mere attempt of 
determining the destiny of the continent rhetorically whereas the reality proves totally the opposite 
to put the rhetoric into practice. 
The other point of paradox in NEPAD relates to its understanding of the globalization process and 
the associated discourse of marginalization and exclusion. NEPAD explicitly mentioned as a long-
term objective that ending the marginalization of the continent in globalization is a must. The 
globalization process is understood as a process of greater integration and interdependence which 
84 
 
could offer ideal opportunities for African economies with a cautious note that it has „…nothing 
inherent that automatically reduces poverty and inequality‟ (par.40). For this reason and based on the 
premise that Africa has been excluded from the process and playing a marginal role, NEPAD is 
intending to re-integrate Africa into the „global economy and body politic‟. It is stated that, „[W]hile 
globalization has increased the cost of Africa‟s ability to compete, we hold that the advantages of an 
effectively managed integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty 
reduction‟ (par.28) (emphasis mine).  
What has been considered marginalization of Africa from the globalization process is a blind 
interpretation of the real position that Africa has in the process. In fact, it is not a matter of 
exclusion or marginalization, as many have argued; it is rather the nature of integration that is 
exploitative and against best interests of the continent. Africa is not loosely integrated into the 
„global economy and body politic‟: it is rather deeply immersed into an asymmetrical system of 
global capital „accumulation by dispossession‟. Nabudere argues that what is being taken as 
marginalization of Africa in terms of NEPAD is not the result of Africa‟s absence from, or poor 
integration, into the process; rather it is a result of the exploitation within the global political 
economy that has been going on for centuries (Nabudere 2002, p.64). Samir Amin argues that the 
concept of marginalization is totally flawed. He contends that, it is the nature of the integration into 
the global system that needs to be considered rather than the degree of integration. „The so-called 
marginalized countries are, in fact, the super-exploited in a brutal manner – and therefore, 
impoverished countries, not countries located at the margin of the system‟ (Amin 2002, p.2). The 
controversial insights of NEPAD on the process of globalization and marginalization of the 
continent are further criticized by other scholars and characterized as a failed attempt of both 
diagnosing the problem and giving the remedy from the same context. The stated goals and the 
means of realizing them contradict at every level. As it is argued: 
NEPAD argues for unrestricted commitment to global free trade, on the one hand, and sees a fairer, 
more equitable global regime that delivers development for Africa, on the other; it concedes that the 
policy instruments that define the current neo-liberal globalization have failed to benefit Africa but 
proceeds to argue for more of the same. The solution to Africa‟s „marginality‟ is for the continent to 
become more firmly „locked into globalization‟ (Adesina, et al 2006, p.7) 
85 
 
The „newness‟, the „partnership‟ and the „different approach‟ that NEPAD claims to have are hardly 
manifested in the problematization of the African context, in conceptualizing the development 
challenges and aspirations and above all in the strategies opted to realize the stated objectives. For 
instance, the definition of development given in the document stated that „…development is a 
process of empowerment and self-reliance‟. What NEPAD is claiming is ensuring that „Africans 
(are)… architects of their own sustained upliftment‟ (par.27).  And yet, this process of 
empowerment is planned to be pursued within the context of a fiercely inconvenient process of 
globalization which is under the control of the actors that have been disempowering societies 
through their covert and overt strategies and programs. Moreover, the „self-reliance‟ concept is 
nullified by the objective of NEPAD which explicitly mentioned that „catching up with the 
developed parts of the world‟ is the only way to develop. Indeed, there is no specific strategy of 
realizing a „self-reliant‟ development; rather it is all about replicating the paths of the „developed 
world‟ through the proposed strategies of liberalizing the continent, inviting foreign private 
investment, and having a „sound macro-economic policy‟. The erroneous assumption that NEPAD 
made in appropriating one of the principles of neo-liberalism is its difficulty in differentiating the 
principles and practices of liberalization or free-trade. It is a well-established fact that the „developed 
world‟ is not open to manufactured and processed goods and products of African economies as it 
presents itself with a high degree of protectionism and trade barriers. But NEPAD is assuming that 
the inevitability of the liberalization process is advantageous for Africa and is rushing to integrate 
Africa into the globalization process to end its „marginality‟ and reduce poverty.  
The other crucial point of controversy and paradox in NEPAD‟s development ambition is the role 
of the state and the structure of the political economy it intends to pursue in the continent. The 
document blames many African governments for their failure to empower their people and realize 
development. Moreover, it also reflected on the weakness of the states and the lack of the required 
capacity to carry out long-term development policies and programs (par.23). Indeed, most African 
states were weakened during the structural adjustment period and one of the premises given for the 
introduction of the SAPs in most African countries was the presence of a wide, inefficient and 
ineffective African states structure. The various studies carried out on the effectiveness of the SAPs 
proved that the negative impact was much higher and more severe than the positive achievements. 
Even the WB, the main sponsor of the structural adjustment programs admitted this in one its 
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reports(WB 1988). But NEPAD opted to read this fact from a different angle and stated that the 
SAPs „…provided only a partial solution‟ (par.24). The weakening of the state capacity, the 
deteriorated socio-economic situation of many African countries, the increasing debt burden and the 
growing dependency on aid that are further aggravated by the SAPs are totally ignored by NEPAD. 
According to Loxley (2002, p.122-123), there is a big silence in NEPAD about the possible role that 
the state could play. Though there is a section in the document which describes ‘the New Political Will 
of African Leaders’ the document hardly makes a clear statement what the role of the State as an 
institution should be. More visible is the focus on the creation of an enabling and conducive 
business environment for the private sector as well as for foreign capital flows. By limiting the role 
of State to be a facilitator of private sector endeavors and as a watch-dog of „market-oriented 
economies‟, NEPAD explicitly adhered to the neo-liberal conception of what the State should look 
like. With its submission to the increasing liberalization of the global economy, NEPAD is intending 
to integrate the financial sector of the continent into the global markets, still with the intention of 
bringing development. But, what is not taken into consideration or totally ignored is the necessity of 
having a strong institutional set-up to control and regulate this sector in its functioning and to 
ensure that the long-term development objectives are not compromised. 
In general terms, NEPAD‟s attempt of crafting a new system of interaction with the „developed 
world‟, with a new remedy to the developmental problems of Africa is in many ways deficient if we 
go deeper into its explicit and implicit assumptions. The above mentioned paradoxes and 
controversies are clearly contradictory to the real situation and contribute to the reservations that 
one may have towards NEPAD. 
Chapter Conclusions 
NEPAD emerged as a response to the challenges of Africa‟s development in the 21st century. 
Indeed, it has attempted to present a different conceptualization of Africa‟s quest for development 
and the necessary remedies that can bring positive change. One of the unique features of NEPAD is 
the fact that it is initiated and led by the political leaders. Though there is a fierce criticism for the 
absence of consultation and participation with concerned non-state actors and the wider society, it 
can still be regarded as a purposeful initiative. Indeed, the top-down approach is not unique to 
Africa‟s political economic governance. 
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In answering the core question of problematizing Africa‟s developmental need in a context that 
differs from the already existing parameters is where NEPAD suffers very serious limitations. The 
well established arguments that question the appropriateness of neo-liberal inspired developmental 
narratives are embraced by NEPAD as the ideals of realizing Africa‟s „renaissance‟. The 
asymmetrical power relations between Africa and the major global players are conceived as the 
problem of Africa‟s marginalization. To this end, a „carefully managed integration‟ into the 
globalization process is forwarded as a remedy. This is a very problematic diagnosis and solution 
which ignores various accounts of historical facts and socio-political realities. Some argue that, the 
genesis of the NEPAD project and the journey it travelled with consultations of the G-8, IMF and 
WB before being introduced to the continental forum is a strong indicator in showing the 
conformity of the ideals of NEPAD with the status-quo. Expecting something different from a 
document endorsed by these actors is unrealistic and unthinkable.  
Moreover, the controversial issues that NEPAD raises makes the document prone to further 
criticisms. These include the rhetoric of winning the destiny of the continent into the hands of 
Africans against the unconditional reliance on the „international community‟, and the „self-reliant, 
self-sustained development‟ vis-à-vis the conviction of replicating the socio-economic and political 
features of the „developed‟ world. The implicit assertions that NEPAD is making are in complete 
contradiction with many of the claims it depicts. Instead of questioning the fundamental causes of 
African development problems, NEPAD prefers to stick to the old school interpretation of 
development inquiries in-tandem with contemporary remedies, i.e. „partnership‟. The modernization 
theory and dependency school interpretation of development challenges are used to problematize 
Africa‟s development questions and globalization and „partnership‟ are provided as a solution with a 
flawed analysis and interpretation.  
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Conclusions  
In this final section, the concluding remarks of the entire thesis will be presented. The conclusions 
constitute reflections on the methodological line adopted in carrying out the research, and the link 
between the conceptual framework and the analytical presentation of the documents. These three 
core elements of the thesis (methodology, conceptual framework and analysis) will be examined in 
their capacity of answering the stated research question within the formulated problem statement in 
the first chapter. 
Methodologically, using Critical Discourse Studies/Analysis (CDS) has both an advantage and a 
limitation. CDS enabled the research to give a thorough consideration for textual and contextual 
elements that inform the development documents. Both implicit and explicit assertions in the 
documents, the controversies and paradoxes, the strength and weakness of the documents are 
analyzed contextually. The structural and historical conditions that influenced the presence of certain 
dominant narratives, the actors and the position of the actors, the relationship among the actors, the 
interpretation of the same factual elements in constituting different (sometime contradictory) 
realities are given due emphasis by using CDS. With the research objective focusing mainly on the 
idea of development and its conceptualization, using CDS makes the analysis more critical and 
insightful at the idea and abstract level. In answering the research question and achieving the 
objective of the research, CDS helps the research both in setting an enabling analytical framework as 
well as a limited but in-depth inquiry of the documents. The limited analysis is mainly because of the 
conscious decision of not analyzing the soundness of the strategies and implementation programs. 
The research tried to avoid a policy evaluation kind of approach. By taking the documents as one 
form of social action with actors having their own interest, power and agency, and the interplay 
between these actors along the core concept of „development‟, CDS helped to have a critical 
reflection on the entire scenario. 
The limitation in using CDS as a tool is mainly observed in its openness to accommodate different 
viewpoints that are hardly detached from the researcher‟s perspective. The relative freedom of the 
researcher to focus on some issues or disregard other elements may not be accepted easily in 
producing „valid knowledge‟, unless it is justified convincingly.   
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On the hand, the challenge to conduct the planned in-depth interviews with higher officials and 
experts contributed to the limited focus given to the power relations in the practical scene and the 
views of the officials. Hence, the relevance of the research is mainly in understanding and critically 
analyzing the ideas and discourses that inform the documents rather than the extent of identifying 
challenges and contestations in realizing their objectives in practice. This can be regarded as the 
scope/limitation of the research. But it is believed that a thorough analysis at this level may ease 
further work on the documents by setting a broad analytical framework. The established framework 
of analysis will certainly help any attempt of understanding the documents from various vantage 
points. 
Conceptual Conclusions  
Development is located within the historical, socio-economic and political spheres of social action. 
Hence; its conception, practice and outcomes are mediated by the kind of interaction that it involves 
both implicitly and explicitly. Setting the developmental endeavors within/about Africa across the 
historical lines, the position and interest of the actors, the power relation among the actors and 
above all in the epistemic inquiry of producing knowledges about development is the purpose of this 
thesis. In doing so, the ideological orientation of developmental discourse and the position of some 
actors in interpreting and reading historical facts, producing knowledges, imposing and counter 
balancing discourses was the core engagement. 
There are plenty of interpretations with regard to answering the developmental problems of Africa. 
These attempts have their own line of analysis in problematizing the context, prioritizing their own 
relevant issues and determining the outcomes of the development endeavors. In Africa‟s context, 
within the realm of the study period, one can mention a number of initiatives that conceived Africa‟s 
developmental problems in their own manner and their attempt to impact the process through their 
actions. Most of these initiatives focused on enhancing the economic productivity and strength of 
the continent in general and African countries in particular. 
There are two valuable initiatives that tried to address the developmental problems of Africa in an 
institutional manner. These two major initiatives AAF-SAP and NEPAD came into existence not as 
a specific attempt of effecting change in the continent, rather as a holistic approach of providing a 
broad framework of reference for the entire continent. Given the fairly agreed context of the socio-
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economic crisis and deterioration particularly in the 1980s and the unsuccessful attempt of 
addressing the problems through stabilization and structural adjustment programs, the research 
intended to question what kinds of alternative insights informed these two development documents. 
By questioning to what extent Africa‟s context was problematized and how development questions 
were conceptualized differently, the thesis attempted to critically analyze the two documents as a 
case study. 
The analytical tool adopted to answer the stated research question discussed the various 
contestations related to the theorization and conceptualization of „development‟. Development is 
seldom a neutral process of positive change inspired by goodwill and noble intentions. It is neither a 
merely technical process guided by experts and professionals.  It has complicated features that are 
influenced by the power positions of the actors, their ideological orientations, and above all the 
epistemological framework employed. The contested nature of „development‟ both as a theory and a 
practice, as an ideology and a discourse, has an extended influence in informing programs and 
policies as well as institutional engagements. The ideals of modernizing societies and thereby 
developing them, liberalizing economies in line with goals of alleviating poverty, adjusting structural 
bottlenecks so as to enhance markets are all practiced and executed by actors and institutions. The 
inherent power dynamics among institutions, the interests they would like to materialize as well as 
the ideas they intend to interpret into actions makes the entire notion of „development‟ the highest 
point of political engagement. 
The political features of „development‟ do not start at the point of practice. They are rather deeply 
located into the epistemic orientation of the theoretical explanations and inquiries. The epistemic 
position determines the reading and interpretation of the socio-historical processes that influenced 
the present reality either directly or indirectly. As is argued by the decolonial school of thought, the 
position assumed in interpreting historical facts and building a reality is by itself a sphere of power 
relations. The power of some actors in presenting a certain feature of history and the use of these 
historical facts into the development narratives makes all theoretical explanations of development 
incomprehensive and open to critique. This makes „development‟ a phenomenon beyond an 
engagement of only technical and managerial endeavors.  
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The AAF-SAP & NEPAD: the quest for development alternatives 
It is nearly a general truth that Africa has suffered wide-ranging socio-economic and political crises 
particularly since the 1980s. Various reasons have been forwarded to explain this situation. The 
differences among the explanations influenced the solutions prescribed. The AAF-SAP explicitly 
argued that a basic factor that defined Africa‟s situation is the flawed structure of the political 
economy, specifically the production and consumption patterns. Moreover, the AAF-SAP critically 
examined the remedies forwarded to tackle the challenges of Africa‟s development with a thorough 
reflection on their conceptualization and practice. By identifying the problematic nature of the 
previous development narratives, particularly the SAPs, the AAF-SAP set a different and new 
framework of problematizing Africa‟s problems and conceptualizing the development path. The 
underlining purpose of producing the AAF-SAP was the conviction to craft an African-centered, 
plausible and appropriate development framework to the African political economic context. The 
reading of the socio-historical and political processes of the continent, linking the observed 
challenges with the historical past and the present realities as well as a critical analysis of the 
engagements so far informed the „alternative framework‟.  
The „alternative framework‟ presented its development scheme in a totally different manner than 
what was done so far. For instance, the „structural‟ impediments it identified are deeply rooted into 
the entire organization of the production and consumption system of African economies rather than 
limited to the issues of balance of payment or high inflation, as identified by SAPs. Moreover, the 
kind of positive change that it intended to realize in African societies and the ethics of change are 
formulated to be part and parcel of the production and consumption system. This critical stand 
helped the AAF-SAP to take the real socio-historical, cultural and political features of African 
societies as a point of departure for the development endeavors it envisaged. Rather than depicting 
„development‟ as a progress along a linear line, the AAF-SAP conceptualized development as a 
process that constitutes the socio-psychological, historical and cultural conditions of the people.  
There is a genuine attempt in setting the entire notion of Africa‟s development in a comprehensive 
framework focusing on the root causes so as to contribute to the long-term transformation of 
African economies. The AAF-SAP gave equal attention both for endogenous and exogenous factors 
as well as short-term and long-term objectives. The „human-centered‟ approach to development, the 
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wealth redistribution and welfare scheme for the majority (the poor and the vulnerable), the 
conviction to realize „self-reliant and self-sustaining development‟, the balanced role it gives to the 
state and the private sector, the nature and ethics of societal change it aspired to be free from 
„imitative modernism‟ are indeed radical departures from the dogmatic market-oriented perspectives 
of development of the 1980s.  
The process that AAF-SAP have passed through during its formulation, the technocratic processes, 
the  consecutive ministerial meetings and the adoption at the OAU general assembly did not prevent 
it from being sidelined. The main reason for AAF-SAP to vanish from the discourse of African 
political economy is its fierce contestation of hegemonic perspectives of development. The entire 
reading and interpretation of African historical, social, political, economic and cultural reality is 
diametrically opposite to what has been taken for granted. Indeed, the WB in its immediate report 
tried to show some sympathy to the ideals of AAF-SAP, at least rhetorically. But the power of 
certain ideas remained unchallenged in pursung the development business as usual. 
On the other hand, NEPAD failed to capture the bigger picture of Africa‟s developmental inquiry 
and limited its diagnosis and solutions within the existing framework of thinking and practicing 
development. NEPAD‟s conceptualization of development is a replica of what has been presented 
in almost all development narratives backed by discourses of marginalization and globalization. The 
narrow reading and interpretation of African socio-economic and political history, the obsession to 
the ideals of „westernization‟ and the naïve belief in embracing the opportunities of globalization and 
liberalization are basic attributes that can describe NEPAD. It is an attempt of maintaining the 
status-quo both in conceptualizing and practicing development in Africa‟s context. It has more 
conformity to the dominant discourse and ideology of „development‟ than to the practical lived 
reality of African people.  
What makes NEPAD strong in the political scene is the support it has from the political leaders, the 
main global players and the institutions that favor their action. NEPAD is currently taken as the 
economic development program of the African Union mainly because it is an initiative from the 
political leaders. This clearly shows one of the basic features of „development‟, i.e. the interest of 
actors and their position in the power structure, play a more significant role than the ideals that 
inform the discourse. The praises that were forwarded to NEPAD were not because of its 
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unreserved conviction to change Africa‟s „backwardness‟, to „end poverty‟ or narrowing the 
inequality gap. Rather because of the means it succinctly adopted to achieve its objectives, i.e. 
liberalization of African economies, minimal role of the state, the unprecedented priority given to 
FDI and the private sector, and above all the role of the „international community‟ in managing the 
process through „partnership‟. NEPAD hardly challenges the existing global order and power 
structure; rather it confirms both in diagnosis and prescription for African developmental problems. 
NEPAD‟s conceptualization of development is too shallow and simplistic mainly in setting a 
development objective of „catching up‟ and claiming that the main problem for Africa‟s 
development is its „marginalization‟. The rhetorical commitment to win the decision-making role on 
African issues for Africans is disregarded in setting the development objectives and intended 
practices. What NEPAD does is more of providing a superficial remedy for the African 
developmental problems by using the power that its initiators have on the political economic scene. 
The so-called „partners‟ will also remain happily engaged in the process of realizing NEPAD‟s 
objective, since it is „silent‟ in questioning their power position as well as because of the „legitimate‟ 
role given to them to lead the initiative.   
In general, NEPAD came into the scene 12 years after the AAF-SAP. In terms of addressing the 
developmental challenges both documents share fairly the same historical/material context. But the 
manner in which the documents crafted a possible alternative perspective for Africa‟s development 
is squarely opposite. The continuity of ideas one may trace between the two documents is very 
limited, or only at rhetorical level, whereas, their difference in envisioning Africa‟s future (like 
avoiding „imitative modernism‟ vs. „catching up‟ ) is  wide. The „Alternative Framework’ of AAF-SAP is 
clearly visible in its rigorous attempt of understanding African political economy differently and 
providing remedies that challenge both internal and external contexts and features of African 
political economy. On the contrary, the „Newness’ that NEPAD claims may be found only in its 
unconditional acceptance of the asymmetrical position that Africa has as global player and the 
willingness to continue playing the same role. 
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